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In recent years, the caseload of the federal appellate courts
has grown alarmingly in both the number of filings and the complexity of the issues presented for decision. In an effort to cope
with the pressures created by those increases, the courts have modified the manner in which they process cases in a number of ways.
Some changes, such as prehearing settlement conferences,1 have
relatively little impact on the nature of the judicial process. The
effect of others, such as reduction in oral argument, 2 is more significant, for they alter the traditional method of judging appeals in
ways that may substantially reduce the quality of appellate justice.
One of the most dramatic of the recent innovations is the
adoption by many courts of rules that determine which opinions
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See, e.g., Goldman, The Civil Appeals Management Plan: An Experiment in Appellate ProceduralReform, 78 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1209 (1978); Note, The Minnesota Supreme
Court PrehearingConference-An Empirical Evhluation, 63 MINN. L. REv. 1221 (1979).

1 See generally 2 ADvISORy

COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE, APPELLATE JUSTcE: 1975,

at 2-32 (1975) [hereinafter cited as APPELLATE JUSTICE].
3 This article discusses publication only in the United States Courts of Appeals. Many
state courts also have adopted positions concerning unpublished opinions, sometimes arousing a good deal of controversy. See generally Kanner, The Unpublished Appellate Opinion:
Friend or Foe?, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 386 (1973); Newbern & Wilson, Rule 21: Unprecedent and
the DisappearingCourt, 32 ARK. L. Rxv. 37 (1978).
On the question of publication generally, see P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 31-41 (1976); Chanin, A Survey of the Writing and Publication of
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lication the courts have been truly innovative; in spite of the pivotal role of the published judicial opinion in the development of
American common law, the selection of cases for publication has
rarely been the subject of publicly delineated criteria. The recent
formal decisions not to publish large numbers of opinions have
aroused concern that the quality of the work produced by the
courts will be adversely affected. That concern has in turn led to
considerable discussion of the merits and demerits of a formally
organized regime of limited publication. Although the discussion
has been rich in theory, it has been relatively poor in data.5
This article attempts to fill that gap. It presents an empirical
assessment of the workings of the publication plans of the eleven
United States Courts of Appeals during the 1978-79 Reporting
Year. This is the first system-wide analysis of these publication
plans and their effect on judicial productivity and responsibility.
The article begins with a review of the background of publication
plans. Then, after noting the methods used in the study, we analyze the relation between the language of the plans and the publication rates of the several circuits. Next comes an empirical assessment of the costs and benefits of limited publication. Finally, we
propose a Model Rule for publication, designed to realize the bene-

fits of limited publication while avoiding some of its hazards.
Opinions in Federaland State Appellate Courts, 67 LAW Lm. J. 362 (1974); Joiner, Limiting Publication of Judicial Opinions, 56 JUDICATURE 195 (1972).
4 The authors of this article have written on limited publication in two other places:
Reynolds & Richman, The Non-PrecedentialPrecedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUm. L. REv. 1167 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Non-PrecedentialPrecedent];Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publicationin
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 1979 DuKE L.J. 807 [hereinafter cited as Limited
Publication].
A bibliography on publication in federal appellate courts would also include the following: Hearings Before the Commission on Revision of the Federal Appellate Court System
(2d phase 1974-75) [hereinafter cited as Hearings];Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished
Opinions:Denial of Equal Justice?, 61 A.B.A.J. 1224 (1975); Note, UnreportedDecisions in
the United States Courts of Appeals, 63 CORNLL L. REv. 128 (1977); Comment, A Snake
in the Path of the Law: The Seventh Circuit's Non-PublicationRule, 39 U. Pirr. L. REv.
309 (1977).
5 There have been several publications that, while not empirical, are at least anecdotal.
They review the unpublished opinions of a particular court and argue that some or many of
them should have been published. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 4; Comment, supra note 4.
Limited Publication,supra note 4, is an empirical study but it is limited in scope, covering
only two circuits and decisions over roughly three months. See also Remarks of John P.
Frank, Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference (July 29, 1976) (unpublished study of 50 unpublished opinions) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
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I.

BACKGROUND

A. A Perspective on Publication
In order to appreciate the importance of the limited publication debate, it is necessary to understand both the role of publication in American law, and past publication practice. The reasoned,
published appellate opinion is the centerpiece of the American judiciary's work. The reasons for that prominence are not hard to
understand, for they inhere in the role of appellate judges in a system of common law.
The rule of precedent is fundamental to the common law.6 In
order to ensure consistency, judges explain why they decided as
they did and why apparently similar cases were not thought to be
controlling. Because opinions make law, these explanations must
be readily accessible to interested persons. Their public availability
is necessary to guide both the persons who may be affected by the
law, and the judges who will apply that law to future disputes. The
opinions of appellate courts naturally have special significance because of their position in the judicial hierarchy, and because the
workload of nisi prius courts has made it increasingly difficult for
them to issue polished opinions that contribute to the growth of
the law.
Against this background, it is surprising that the expectation
of a reasoned and published decision is a relatively recent one.
Viewed in historical perspective, limited publication is hardly a
radical idea; until recently, case reporting has been a haphazard
enterprise. English cases have been officially reported only since
1865, following a long history of selective reporting by legal entrepreneurs.$ Similarly, American reporting, virtually unknown until
The propositions in this paragraph should, of course, be familiar to every American

lawyer. See generally H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958); Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv.

L. REV. 457 (1897); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv.
L. REv. 2 (1959). One of the authors of this article has set forth his views on the subject in
more detail in W. REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL (1980).
7 See generally R. WALKER & M. WALKER, THE ENGLISH -LEGAL SYSTEM 139-41 (4th ed.
1976), which criticizes the entire reporting system for its "informality." Official English re-

porting today produces the Law Reports under the aegis of the Incorporated Council of Law
Reporting for England and Wales. There also are unofficial reporters, the most familiar of
which is the All England Law Reports.
a The first English reports are the Year Books, which began, perhaps as a kind of early
legal newspaper, in the reign of Edward L See T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW 269 (5th ed. 1956). Private reporting developed with the end of the Year
Books in 1537. The quality of the private reports varied greatly. Holdsworth called Sir
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the start of the nineteenth century, 9 was long the province of private venturers. Indeed, private reporting continued in at least
some federal courts until well after the Civil War. 10 These publications only gradually came to reflect an appreciation shared by
judge and reporter concerning the form and content of the report.11 Today, of course, legal reporting is dominated by the West
James Burrow (1701-1782) the "connecting link" between "old" and modern reporting because Burrow strove for completeness and accuracy. 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 110-12, 116 (1938).
Apparently there is no general work on the history of publication in the United
States. Ephraim Kirby's 1789 volume of Connecticut Reports was the first reporter published in this country, see L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 282 (1973), although
modern historians have unearthed and published reports of colonial cases. See, e.g., D.
BOORSTIN, DELAWARE CASES 1792-1830 (1943); PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS 1695-1729 (C. Bond ed. 1933). Hence the comment, "Historians actually know more
about colonial case law today than could have been widely known in colonial America."
Johnson, John Jay: Lawyer in a Time of Transition, 1764-1775, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1260,
1264 n.17 (1976). Another example of early publication is found in Maryland, where a court
reporter and a young attorney began publishing colonial Maryland cases as a private venture in 1809. See C. BOND, THE COURTS OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND: A HISTORY 111 (1928). In
contrast, publication in Massachusetts began with authorization from the legislature in
1804. W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 168 (1975). Publication of New
York cases began in 1794. Johnson, supra, at 1264 n.17.
Publication of Supreme Court opinions did not begin until the second volume of Dallas's Reports was published in 1798. Even then progress lagged; although the third volume
appeared in 1799, the fourth was held up until 1807. Other sources for Supreme Court work,
such as newspapers, apparently were unsatisfactory. See J. GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 664-65 (History of the Supreme Court of the United States, vol. 1,
1971).
10 Samuel Blatchford, both district and circuit judge before joining the Supreme Court,
reported Second Circuit decisions until 1887 when the Federal Reporter, begun several
years earlier, put him out of business. See M. SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT 44 (1970).
11 When Roger Taney became Chief Justice, for example,
[t]here was widespread disagreement ... as to the subject matter to be included in the
reports ....
The question was much discussed in law journals ....
Reviewers varied
all the way from those who wanted to save money for lawyers by limiting publication to
selected opinions, to those who advocated publication of all opinions together with arguments of counsel and other relevant documents.
C. SWISHER, THE TANSY PERIOD, 1835-64, at 296 (History of the Supreme Court of the
United States, vol. 4, 1974).
Standards were quite lax, even for Supreme Court reporting. Errors abounded, and
sometimes the reporter failed to include dissenting opinions. Id. at 300-02. Justice Story
found it commendable that reporters corrected grammatical and typographical errors. See
id. at 299-300. Benjamin Howard, in the first volume of his Reports (1843), "resorted to
what seemed an amazing example of bad taste by advertising his availability for the argument of cases." Id. at 308.
Uneven reporting required that both state and federal reports be regularly reviewed in
the law reviews for quality and coverage. See, e.g., 8 AM. L.J. 273 (1848) (New Jersey); 1 AM.
L. REG. 60 (1853) (Second Circuit).
Full and accurate reporting depended upon the development of a tradition of full and
complete judicial explication of the decision. This is a relatively recent development. Lord
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Publishing Company. It routinely publishes all opinions sent to it
by the circuit judges in accordance with their respective publication plans. 12

Limited publication, then, is not new. What is new and radical
is the notion that the judges themselves should be controlling access to their work by means of systematic publication plans. The
publication plans of the federal courts of appeals collectively re-

present the most ambitious systematic effort to reconcile the conflict between the costs and benefits of full publication.
B. The History of the Circuit Plans
The movement toward the present circuit court publication
plans began in 1964, when the Judicial Conference of the United
States recommended that the federal courts authorize "the publication of only those opinions which are of general precedential
value."13 Eight years later, 4 the Board of the Federal Judicial
Center proposed that each Circuit Council establish plans that
Coke advised that "wise and learned men do before they judge labour to reach to the depth
of all the reasons of the case in question, but in their judgments express not any." 3 Co.
Rep. v (J. Thomas ed., London 1826).
A look through state reports around 1800 reveals what to the modem reader is a startling lack of explication among courts of last resort. In Maryland, for example, the Court of
Appeals often decided cases without an opinion until a statute requiring them was enacted
in 1832. Lower courts were more prone to give reasons in order that their decisions could be
properly reviewed on appeal. C. BOND,supra note 9, at 139-40.
By the mid-nineteenth century, however, a number of states had imposed, either
through their constitutions or by statute, a requirement that appellate decisions be rendered
in a written opinion. See Radin, The Requirement of Written Opinions, 18 CALIF. L. Rxv.
486 (1930). That such development might not be wholly salutary was foreseen by Jonathan
Swift:
It is a maximum [sic] among these lawyers, that whatever hath been done before
may legally be done again; and therefore they take special care to record all the decisions formerly made against common justice and the general reason of mankind. These,
under the name of precedents, they produce as authorities, to justify the most iniquitous opinions; and the judges never fail of directing accordingly.
J. Swrr, GULIVER's TRAvms 283 (Modem Library ed. 1931) (1st ed. London 1726).
'2 West publishes only opinions designated for publication by the several circuits. Letter to authors from James P. Corson, Managing Editor, West Publishing Co. (May 23, 1980)
(on file with The University of Chicago Law Review). Several federal courts (e.g., the Tax
Court, the Court of Military Appeals) have their own reporter; the Courts of Appeals do not.
Unpublished opinions may be "published" in other sources, such as specialty reporters,
or placed in the memory of a computerized legal research system such as LEXIS, see text
and note at note 30 infra.
13 [1964] JUDICrL CONFERENCE OF THE UNrrED STATES REPORT 11.
"4 Some of the circuits, in the meantime, had made some pronouncements in case law
on the problem of unlimited publication. E.g., Jones v. Superintendent, Va. State Farm, 465
F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1972).
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would limit publication and forbid citation of unpublished opinions. 15 Later that year, the Judicial Conference endorsed the
Center's proposal and directed each circuit to devise a publication
plan."6 In 1974, the Center published a Model Rule for publication, 17 a proposal that has been the model for the publication plans
of a number of circuits. Meanwhile, the circuits, responding to the
Judicial Conference directive, had each sent a proposed publication plan to the Conference. The Conference applauded the diversity of these plans, for it meant that there would be "11 legal laboratories accumulating experience and amending their publication
plans on the basis of that experience."1' 8 Little has changed since

15
APRIL

BOARD OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT TO THE

1972

SESSION OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE PUBLICATION

(1972). The various groups mentioned in the text are described in more detail in Non-PrecedentialPrecedent,supra note 4, at 1170-71 & nn. 18,
25, 26.
16[1972] JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT 33.
OF COURTS OF APPEALS OPINIONS

17

ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE JUSTICE,

DARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS

FJC

RESEARCH SERIES

(1973) [hereinafter cited

No. 73-2,

as STANDARDS].

STAN-

The

development of these Standards is discussed in more detail in Non-PrecedentialPrecedent,

supra note 4, at 1170-71 & n.25. The Model Rule provides:
1. Standard for Publication
An opinion of the (highest court) or of the (intermediate court) shall not be designated for publication unless:
a. The opinion establishes a new rule of law or alters or modifies an existing rule;
or
b. The opinion involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; or
c. The opinion criticizes existing law; or
d. The opinion resolves an apparent conflict of authority.

2. Opinions of the court shall be published only if the majority of the judges participating in the decision find that a standard for publication as set out in section (1) of
this rule is satisfied. Concurring opinions shall be published only if the majority opinion is published. Dissenting opinions may be published if the dissenting judge determines that a standard for publication as set out in section (1) of this rule is satisfied.
The (highest court) may order any unpublished opinion of the (intermediate court) or
a concurring or dissenting opinion in that court published.
3. If the standard of publication as set out in section (1) of the rule is satisfied as to
only a part of an opinion, only that part shall be published.
4. The judges who decide the case shall consider the question of whether or not to
publish an opinion in the case at the conference on the case before or at the time the
writing assignment is made, and at that time, if appropriate, they shall make a tenta-

tive decision not to publish.
5. All opinions that are not found to satisfy a standard for publication as prescribed
by section (1) of this rule shall be marked, Not Designated for Publication. Opinions
marked, Not Designated for Publication, shall not be cited as precedent by any court
or in any brief or other'materials presented to any court.
18 [1974] JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNrrED STATES REPORT 12. While the Judicial
Conference studied publication, the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate
System (chaired by Senator Hruska) also looked at the problem. Although the Hruska Coin-

1981]

Limited Publication

1974. Although the Judicial Conference left the circuits' publication plans in a state of experimentation, there has been little effort
to assess the results of those experiments either by scholars 9 or
the federal judicial establishment.2 0
C.

The Pros and Cons of Limited Publication

The justification for limited publication rests on three premises: first, there is no need to publish all opinions; second, full publication is costly; and third, judges can effectively determine when
an opinion need be published. Each of those premises can be disputed. In addition, several distinct counterarguments can be advanced against limited publication.21
1. Dispute Settling and Lawmaking. Common law opinions
have two functions: they settle disputes among litigants and, in doing so, sometimes make law.2 2 Not all opinions, even at the appellate level, make law. Opinions may only reaffirm well-settled principles. These, the argument runs, need not be published, for
society has no real interest in them. Such decisions are important
to the litigants, but not to anyone else.
This argument is flawed by its reliance on a view of judicial
lawmaking as the statement of mechanical rules rather than principles extracted from the decisions of cases read in their factual
context. When judicial lawmaking is viewed in that light, it can be
seen that all decisions make law, or at least contribute to the process, for each shows how courts actually resolve disputes. Applicamission recommended the adoption of limited publication and noncitation plans, the Commission deferred to the Judicial Conference concerning details. COMMISSION ON REVISION OF
THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMEN-

50-52 (1975) [hereinafter cited as HRUSKA REPORT]. The testimony of
judges, lawyers, and academics before the Commission provides valuable insight on the
question of selective publication and noncitation. See Hearings, supra note 4.
1 See text and notes at notes 3-5 supra.
20 Indeed, even the useful PublicationPlans Reports prepared by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts for the years 1973 through 1977 have been terminated,
which suggests that the plans may have come to be considered permanent. The Publication
Plans Reports were prepared for the Subcommittee on Federal Jurisdiction of the Committee on Court Administration of the Judicial Conference of the United States. See NonPrecedentialPrecedent, supra note 4, at 1173 n.34. As far as we know, these reports represent the only effort sponsored by the entire federal judicial establishment to evaluate the
workings of the plans. The Ninth Circuit, however, did sponsor a limited study by John
Frank of publication in that circuit. See Remarks of John P. Frank, supra note 5.
21 More detailed discussion of the material in this section can be found in Non-Precedential Precedent,supra note 4, at 1181-85, 1187-94, 1199-1204.
22 See H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 6, at 396-97.
DATIONS FOR CHANGE
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tions of general principles in specific contexts clarify the scope of
the principles. At the same time, such applications demonstrate
whether the principles are actually followed by judges in routine
cases or are simply "paper rules," useful mainly for display. The
unavailability of decisions thus reduces our ability to understand
the principles relied on by the court.
2. The High Cost of Full Publication.The second premise of
the argument for limited publication asserts that excessive costs
are associated with full publication. Those costs fall into two categories, one linked to the preparation of an opinion, the other to its
consumption.
Preparing opinions is a large part of a judge's workload. More
time must be spent if the opinion will be published-to allow more
proofreading and prose polishing, for example. More effort also is
required to ensure that the opinion contains no loose language that
can return to haunt the court in a later case. Eliminating these
costs can help judges cope more effectively with heavy workloads
with little or no diminution in the quality of justice dispensed. Or
so the argument goes. Although the idea seems plausible it has
never been verified empirically."8
The second part of the excessive cost argument focuses on the
cost of full publication to the consumers of opinions. To American
lawyers this is a familiar problem. "The endless search for factual
analogy"2 4 runs up the bill of the conscientious attorney with little
or no gain in the refinement of legal principles. Law libraries and
their budgets are strained to the breaking point and beyond. The
bar looks with envy upon England, where the reported case law
fills but a few volumes a year.s2 These are real concerns, yet it
must be remembered that even cumulative opinions have value.
They can suggest how firm a line of precedent may be, for example, or indicate problems in the application of articulated precedent, or even show the divergence of a rule from the expectations
of those to whom it is addressed. Thus, value can be found in publishing any opinion; the real question is whether the associated
costs are too high.
2S We know of only one effort to do so, and it is unreliable. See Non-PrecedentialPrecedent, supra note 4, at 1183 n.95 (discussion of a study of time allocation in the Third
Circuit); cf. text and notes at notes 59-67 infra (finding that evidence is at best inconclusive
as to increased productivity).
24 STANARDS, supra note 17, at 17.
" In 1979, for example, the All England Reports comprised three volumes.
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3. The Early DecisionNot to Publish. Many of the cost savings associated with limited publication would be lost if judges
made the decision not to publish only after the opinion had already been polished and made ready for public consumption. An
early decision not to publish entails significant costs, however, for
value inheres in the actual writing of the opinion. For many authors, writing about a subject helps them to develop their thought
on the topic. Furthermore, if an opinion in support of a decision
simply "will not write," the conscientious judge is forced to reconsider the decision.2 The danger here is that the decision not to
publish will affect the reasoning or even the result.
Another major problem with an early decision not to publish
centers on the ability of a court to predict, early in the judicial
process, that its opinion will not make law. The ability of judges to
do so is by no means self-evident. If the prediction process is imperfect, the legal community will have lost access to opinions it
should see.
4. Further Arguments Against Nonpublication. Limited
publication can be attacked even if the above premises prove true.
First, limited publication reduces judicial responsibility by removing the constraints that stare decisis places upon the court. The
concept of precedent cautions as well as governs. If an opinion is
not to be published, unwise things may be said without fear that
the corpus juris will be adversely affected. Judicial responsibility
also may be diminished if courts use the nonpublication list as a
respository for troublesome cases presenting issues the court does
not wish to address in public. Again, nonpublication may permit
judges to approach their jobs more routinely, without the real
thought and effort that precedential decision making requires. The
final counterargument to limited publication recognizes the role
played by the availability of opinions in holding judges accountable for their actions. If "[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants, ' ' 27 then limited publication may permit sores to fester.
5. A Word on Citation Practices.As part of their approach
to limited publication, seven of the circuits prohibit citation to an
unpublished opinion, and an eighth discourages the practice; only
three circuits permit free citation of such opinions.28 The prohibi2" Hearings,supra note 4, at 735 (testimony of Professor Terrance Sandalow). See also
note 151 infra.
" L. BnANDms, OTR PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (1914).
Is The seven rules prohibiting citation of unpublished opinions are D.C. Cm . 8(f;
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tion of citation is part and parcel of the limited publication ap-

proach, for without such rules its goals could easily be frustrated.
If citation were freely permitted, both litigants and judges would

be unable to realize the potential time savings from not having to

read unpublished opinions.2 9 In addition, the prohibition on citation is necessary to prevent unfairness arising from the ability of
well-heeled litigants to monitor, store, and use unpublished opinions more readily than other litigants.3 0

The perception in seven circuits that a noncitation rule is a
necessary aspect of a limited publication plan therefore seems sub-

stantially accurate. We have doubts, however, about the efficacy of
noncitation rules. The hidden problem is whether the judges and
their staffs adhere to the rule. We have found few opinions refer-

ring to unpublished opinions, indicating at least facial compliance
with the noncitation rule. Still, some uneasiness persists, based on

the intuition that not everyone who is aware of how cases have
been decided will refrain from using that knowledge in later litiga-

tion. Our concern centers on pro se civil rights and habeas corpus
cases. To the judges and clerks who handle those appeals, reliance
on unpublished decisions--"non-precedential
precedents" 1
-must be inevitable. The caseload is large, and there is often a
previous decision squarely on point that provides a tempting research tool. Yet many of these cases are frivolous and hence go
1ST

Cm. R. 14;

2D

Cm. R. 0.23; 6TH Cm R. 11; 7TH Cm. R. 35(b)(2)(iv);

8TH

Cm. R. app.; 9TH

Cm. R. 21(e). Neither the Third nor the Fifth Circuit addresses the citation issue. Only the
Tenth affirmatively permits citation, 10TH Cm. R. 17(c); opposing parties must be seived
with a copy of any unpublished opinions that will be used. The Fourth Circuit permits but
discourages citation. 4TH Cm R. 18(d)(ii)-(iii).
2 See Non-PrecedentialPrecedent, supra note 4, at 1186-87. This is especially true
given the publication of "unpublished" opinions in unofficial specialty reporters and the
recently developed computer systems such as LEXIS, making them available for general use
if citation is permitted.
" Id. at 1187. The ability of courts to control circulation of unpublished opinions has
been greatly diminished by the advent of computer-assisted legal research. Although the
LEXIS memory bank purportedly contains only "publishable" opinions, see letter from
Buzz Reed, Mead Data Central (Apr. 25, 1981) (on file with The University of Chicago Law
Review), several of the unpublished opinions discussed in this article are available on the
system. See, e.g., Burrison v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 78-7536 [603 F.2d 211] (2d
Cir. Mar. 29, 1979); Moorer v. Griffin, No. 77-3580 [586 F.2d 844] (6th Cir. Oct. 12, 1978);
United States v. Vera, No. 77-5363 [582 F.2d 1281] (6th Cir. July 10, 1978). All of these
cases appear in the FederalReporter (2d), but only as parts of tables of unpublished opinions. These opinions are available only to those able to pay for the service. Such limited
circulation exacerbates the problem of unequal access.
1 The phrase comes from Judge Robert Sprecher's testimony before the Hruska Commission. Hearings,supra note 4, at 537.
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unpublished.32 The result may be reliance on a substantial research
library or "issues file" that is unavailable to the litigants.33
D. A Necessary Note on Workload
The following sections analyze various problems associated
with limited publication plans. Reflection upon those issues must
include consideration of the difficulties that led the courts to adopt
the publication plans: the increases in the volume and complexity
of the work of the federal courts.
Apocalyptic commentaries on the workload of the United
States Courts of Appeals are not hard to find.' Their very familiarity may rob them of some of their impact. Examination of the
product of the circuit courts over even a short period lends some
perspective, dramatically bringing home the overload.
This study covered the year ending June 30, 1979. In that
time, the eleven circuits terminated 12,419 cases following judicial
action. 5 During that period there were 97 circuit judges. 6 On average, each of those judges decided about 1.2 cases per working
day.3 7 For each vote a participating judge must have done some
See text at note 148 infra for the tendency to permit a disproportionate number of
opinions in such cases to go unpublished.
Hearings,supra note 4, at 537 (testimony of Judge Sprecher).
4 A sample of these alarming recitations can be found in NLRB v. Amalgamated
Clothing Workers, 430 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1970); HnusKA REPORT, supra note 18, at 55; Haworth, Screening and Summary Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1973
WASH. U.L.Q. 257.
3'That figure is obtained from statistical data supplied by the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts (Sept. 24, 1980) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Statistical Data], by adding the totals from Tables IP (total
published opinions) and 5U (total unpublished opinions). See note 45 infra for explanation
of the term "with judicial action." The total number here does not include consolidations,
i.e., cases that have separate docket numbers but are briefed, argued, or decided with other
cases in one proceeding. Including consolidations the total is 15,053. (Consolidations estimated as 17.5% of the total number of cases terminated, in accord with ADMimsTRATm
OFFICE OF THE UNrrD STATES CouRTs, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DmECToR 51 [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REORT].)
31 The actual number of authorized judgeships in the United States Circuit Courts was
32

132, but 35 judgeships were unfilled. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 44.
3, The 1.2 figure was computed as follows: Because circuit judges typically sit in panels
of three, in order to determine the total number of judicial votes cast to decide the 12,419
cases, that figure must be multiplied by three; thus there were 37,257 votes cast during the
fiscal year. Of those votes, 77.8% were cast by active circuit judges (the others were cast by
visiting and by senior circuit judges, see id. at 50), a total of 28,986. Assuming 250 working
days for each of the 97 active circuit judges, the total number of "judge-days" in fiscal 197879 was 24,250. Simple division then shows that the average active circuit judge decided almost •1.2 cases per day. (It should be noted that in some proceedings, motions to reduce or
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reading and research. s If all he read were the briefs, staff memoranda, and record in each case, his workdays would be full. In addition, the judge must draft opinions for publication, read the
drafts of other judges' opinions, participate in conference, and hear
arguments. Each judge must try to keep current on developments
in the law, run his staff, help administer his circuit, perhaps serve
on professional committees, and so on.
The point of this fairly dreary exposition is that the object of
this article is not to criticize the judges. Their dedication and industry is beyond question. We aim only to examine and evaluate
one technique that judges have used to streamline their workload.
The next three parts of the article report the empirical study.
We begin with a description of the methodology used in the study.
We then examine the relation between publication frequency and
the content of the several publication plans. Finally, we discuss the
costs and benefits associated with limited publication: What do the
judges gain from nonpublication? Are there any drawbacks associated with those gains? Are there ways to minimize the costs while
realizing most of the gains?

II.

THE STUDY: METHODOLOGY

Our assessment of the impact of the publication plans on the
decision-making process of the courts of appeals is based on a
study of the published and unpublished opinions of those courts
during the 1978-79 Reporting Year.39 Reviewing the material pubgrant bail, for example, circuit judges may act singly. This means the average stated above
is somewhat high.)
Average figures, of course, conceal peaks and valleys among the circuits. In the Fourth
Circuit, for instance, 1236 cases were decided by judicial action. Multiplication by three
yields a total of 3708 votes. Reducing that figure by 20% for votes cast by senior and visiting judges yields 2966. Seven active judges provided 1750 judge-days over the assumed 250
working days, and thus nearly 1.7 decisions per day for each active circuit judge.
In the District of Columbia Circuit, by contrast, the number of cases decided after judicial action was 699, producing 2097 total votes. This figure must be reduced by 20.7% to
account for the contribution of visiting and senior judges. The result of that reduction, 1663,
when divided by 2250 total judge-days (9 judges times 250 working days) yields nearly .74
decisions per judge per day. Percentages of votes cast by active circuit judges are from id. at
51. Cases decided per circuit is computed from StatisticalData, supra note 35, Tables 1P,
5U.
" Some cases naturally present fewer problems than others; many are frivolous. For a
conscientious judge, however, even those present demands on his time. The judge who
wishes to supervise even minimally the work of the staff attorneys and his own law clerks
must spend some time on even the most frivolous appeal.
3, The Reporting Year ran from July 1, 1978 through June 30, 1979. For the statistics
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lished during that period was relatively straightforward; we used
all appeal-dispositive documents-"opinions"' 0q-found in the Federal Reporter (2d) for that year.41 Choosing the unpublished material involved somewhat more selectivity because the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (the administrative and
record-keeping agency of the federal judiciary) distinguishes between appeals terminated "by judicial action" and those terminated "without judicial action. ' 42 We studied only the former
group, because we did not want to include consent decrees, affirmances or reversals by stipulation, or out-of-court settlements. s
Those types of dispositions present only bookkeeping problems to
the judges, and do not require any real exercise of judicial ability;
their inclusion in the study, therefore, would obscure the nature of
what judges in fact do. Accordingly, the total population for this
study included all terminations that were published,4 4 and all unpublished terminations that were by "judicial action."' Table 1
records the population of published and unpublished opinions used

in the study.
kept by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for that period, see ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 35, at A-1 to -175.

41"Opinion" is a generic term. The several circuits refer to their written products by
many different (and at times inconsistent) labels. Included in the term "opinion" for our
purposes are what some circuits would call opinions, memoranda, per curiam opinions, orders, judgments, and judgment orders.
41 A list of "Appeals Terminations" was furnished us by the Administrative Office. All
information compiled by the Office and, in turn, all the information that we used in the
study was compiled from records kept by the individual circuit court clerks on a form
known as "J.S. 34 Appeals Disposition-Termination Form" (on file with The University of
Chicago Law Review) [hereinafter cited as J.S. 34]. In order to generate the list of published
appeals terminations, we selected all terminations whose J.S. 34 forms contained checks in
positions 1, 2, or 3 in box 13 ("Opinion").
42 See the J.S. 34 form, boxes 9 and 10 (termination 'by judicial action), and box 11
(termination without judicial action).
4 Nevertheless, we found a fair number of decisions labeled "judicial action" that were,
in fact, voluntary dismissals and the like.
"A total of 4737 terminations were published. Thirty-eight terminated appeals were
recorded as "published" but as not involving "judicial action"; we therefore excluded them
from the study for reasons explained in text and note at note 43 supra. These inconsistent
designations probably were the result of a reporting error. In any case, their number is
insignificant.
45 This procedure differs from the Administrative Office's typical record-keeping habits
in one important respect. For many purposes (e.g., recording reversal rates and separate
opinion rates), the Office uses as its relevant total disposition population the set of appeals
dispositions that occurred after oral hearing or submission upon the briefs. See, e.g., ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 35, Table B1. For most of the same purposes, we chose the larger population of appeals terminated "by judicial action." The difference between the two populations is that many cases docketed in the courts of appeals are terminated without argument
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TABLE 1
PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS

Circuit

Published

Unpublished

D.C.

194

505

699

First

214

147

361

Second

359

563

922

Third

219

991

1210

Fourth

346

890

1236

Fifth

1385

978

2363

Sixth

340

908

1248

Seventh

325

736

1061

Eighth

448

209

657

Ninth

618

1238

1856

Tenth

251

555

806

4699

7720

12419

Total

Total

SouRcE: StatisticalData, supra note 35, Tables IP, 5U.

or submission upon written briefs. Some of these nevertheless are terminations "by judicial
action." Examples are motions for summary affirmance, motions for stays, and motions for
bail reductions. These cases typically involve some written argument to the court; however,
they are not reported as "submitted upon written briefs" unless the "brief" is the formal
brief contemplated in FED. R. APP. P. 28. Telephone conversation with David Gentry, Research Analyst, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (July 24, 1980). We reasoned that the larger population of appeals terminated "by judicial action" was more appropriate for our study than the smaller set of appeals terminated "after argument or
submission" because the larger group more closely reflects the total case-terminating work
of the judges.
In the course of our study, it became apparent that the total number of opinions indicated as unpublished on the J.S. 34 forms compiled by the Administrative Office included
a few opinions that actually were published. This could be the result either of errors by the
circuit court clerk in filling out the J.S. 34 forms, or of reversals of original decisions not to
publish. Because it was impractical for us to verify independently that each of the nearly
8000 "unpublished" opinions on the list supplied by the Administrative Office was unpublished, we did not correct for these factors. We have no reason to believe that excluding
these opinions would significantly decrease the population size, particularly because coding
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Ill.

RESULTS OF THE STUDY: PUBLICATION PLANS AND
PUBLICATION PERFORMANCE

The fundamental empirical question concerning the publication plans"0 is whether they have any effect at all on the decision to
publish. Do the judges actually pay attention to the plans? Fortunately for the analyst, both the contents of the publication plans
and the extent to which publication is limited vary widely among
the circuits. Differences occur along several lines-the specificity of
publication criteria, the existence vet non of a presumption against
publication, and the maker of the publication decision. 47 This section examines the effect of those differences on the circuits' actual
publication behavior. Table 2, which reports the percentage of
published and unpublished opinions in each circuit, will facilitate
that examination.
TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF OPINIONS PUBLISHED

Circuit

Published (%)

Unpublished (%)

D.C.
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh

27.8
59.3
38.9
18.1
28.0
58.6
27.2
30.6

72.2
40.7
61.1
81.9
72.0
41.4
72.8
69.4

Eighth

68.2

31.8

Ninth
Tenth

33.3
31.1

66.7
68.9

38.3

61.7

Average

SouRcE: Calculated from the data in Table 1 supra.

error presumably would be randomly distributed, with approximately equal numbers of unpublished opinions coded as published and published opinions coded as unpublished.
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Specificity

One aspect in which the plans vary widely is the specificity of
the standards that guide the publication decision. Some plans establish criteria that can only be described as vague. The Third Circuit, for example, prescribes publication only where "the opinion
has precedential or institutional value." 48 Other circuits have specific publication criteria. The Ninth Circuit Plan, for example, provides for publication of an opinion that
(1)

Establishes, alters, modifies or clarifies a rule of law,

or
(2) Calls attention to a rule of law which appears to
have been generally overlooked, or
(3) Criticizes existing law, or
(4) Involves a legal or factual issue of unique interest or
substantial public importance, or
(5) Relies in whole or in part upon a reported opinion in
the case by a district court or an administrative agency, or
(6) Is accompanied by a separate concurring or dissenting expression, and the author of such separate expression
desires that it be reported or distributed to regular
subscribers.49
46

All of the circuits have limited publication plans. In addition, all but one have local

rules that address the question. A circuit's position on limited publication thus can be determined only by looking at both its plan and any relevant local rules. The following are the
relevant rules: D.C. Cm. R. 8(f); 1ST Ci.R.R 14; 2D Cm. R. 0.23; 4TH Cm: R. 18; 5TH Cm. R.
21; 6TH Cm. R. 11; 7TH Cm. R. 35; 8TH Cn R. 14; 9TH Cm. R. 21; 10m CM. R. 17. In the
Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, the publication plan consists simply of
the text of the rule. In the Third Circuit, there is no relevant local rule, but only a publication plan. In the other five circuits, the publication plan is distinct from the local rule on the
question. In two circuits, the First and the Eighth, the publication plans appear as appendices to the circuit's local rules.
' Earlier, we attempted to classify the publication plans of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits as "conservative" and "radical," respectively. Those classifications were somewhat
awkward, but they did permit consideration of these factors. We hypothesized that a radical
plan would produce lower publication percentages than a conservative plan. The data did
not support that hypothesis. See Limited Publication,supra note 4, at 810-14, for an explanation of the terms.
'18THIRD CIRcurr PLAN (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
49 9m Cm. R. 21(b).

Limited Publication

1981]

The circuits can be roughly divided into two groups depending on
the specificity of their publication criteria.50 Table 3 displays the
circuits in that arrangement with the percentage of published and
unpublished opinions produced by each circuit. The data show little correlation between the degree of specificity of a circuit's publication criteria and its actual publication behavior. The average
publication percentage for circuits with detailed standards was
36.5% while the average for circuits with vague standards was
40.4%. On the other hand, the data in Table 3 may give disproporTABLE 3
PUBLICATION RELATED TO SPECIFICITY OF STANDARDS

PUBLICATION IN Cmcurrs WITH VAGUE STANDARDS

Circuit

Published (%)

Unpublished (%)

First
Second
Third
Fifth
Sixth

59.3
38.9
18.1
58.6
27.2

40.7
61.1
81.9
41.4
72.8

40.4

59.6

Average

PUBLICATION IN CIRCUITS WITH SPECIFIC STANDARDS

Published (%)

Unpublished (%)

D.C.

27.8

72.2

Fourth
Seventh

28.0
30.6

72.0
69.4

Eighth

68.2

31.8

Ninth
Tenth

33.3
31.1

66.7
68.9

36.5

63.5

Circuit

Average

50 The circuits with "vague" standards, and th e pertinent rules, are: 1ST Cm. R. app. B;
2D Cm. R. 0.23; THIRD Cmcurr PLAN para. (a); 5TH CIR. R. 21; SixTH Cmcurr PLAN para. 2
(on file with The University of Chicago Law Review). The "specific" rules are: DsTRmCT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT PLAN para. e (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review); 4TH

Cm. R. 18(a);
17(d), e).

7TH

Cm. R. 35(c)(1); 8TH CI. R. app. para. 4; 9TH CIE. R. 21(b); 10TH CE. R.
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tionate effect to the publication habits of the Eighth Circuit. All of
the other circuits with specific standards have publication percentages in the high 20s or low 30s, or less than half the Eighth Circuit's publication percentage of 68.2%. If the Eighth Circuit is excluded, the average percent published for the circuits with specific
standards would be 30.2%, and the percentage of opinions unpublished would be 69.8%. These percentages would indicate that a
substantially greater proportion of opinions are published in circuits with vague standards. Unless and until we discover some
anomalous practice in the Eighth Circuit explaining the disparity,
however, we do not feel justified in excluding the circuit from our
computations. At any rate, we cannot be as confident as the results
of Table 3 might warrant that specificity of standards has no effect
on publication percentage. It may well be that vague standards enhance the likelihood of publication.
B. Presumptions
Another provision that might affect the tendency to publish is
a presumption against publication. Some circuits make such a presumption explicit. The First Circuit Plan, for instance, provides
that
While we do not presently attempt to categorize the criteria which should determine publication, we are confident that
a significantly larger proportion of cases will result in unpublished decisions if the court adopts a policy of self conscious
scrutiny of the publish-worthiness of each disposition coupled
with a presumption, in the absence of justification, against
publication."e
52
In other circuits the presumption is not explicit, but is inferable.
In still other circuits there is no presumption against publication.
Commentators generally have favored publication plans with specific publication standards. The reason for that preference is not really the hope for lower published/nonpub-

lished ratios. Rather, the commentators have believed that vague criteria might be an insufficient guide and that precedential opinions might be lost through misclassification. See
Non-PrecedentialPrecedent,supra note 4, at 1177; Note, supra note 4, at 147.
51 1ST Cm. R. app. B(a).
"The Fourth Circuit, for example, before listing its publication standards provides
that "an opinion shall not be published unless it meets one of the following standards for
publication." 4TH Cm. R. 18(a).
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A plausible hypothesis is that the circuits that have a presumption against publication (explicit or implicit)"3 would publish

less than circuits without such a presumption. Table 4 shows that
circuits without presumptions against publication published 44.9%

of their opinions, while circuits with such a presumption published
only 32.7% of their opinions. The existence of a presumption
against publication, then, does seem to affect actual publication
practice."
TABLE 4
PUBLICATION RELATED TO PRESUMPTIONs AGAINST PUBLICATION

CIRcurrs WITH PRfSUMPTION AGAINST PUBLICATION

Circuit

Published (%)

Unpublished (%)

First
Third
Fourth

59.3
18.1
28.0

40.7
81.9
72.0

Sixth

27.2

72.8

Seventh
Ninth

30.6
33.3

69.4
66.7

32.7

67.3

Average

CiRcUrTs WITHoUT PRESUMPTION AGAINST PUBLICATION

Published (%)

Unpublished (%)

D.C.

27.8

72.2

Second
Fifth
Eighth
Tenth

38.9
58.6
68.2
31.1

61.1
41.4
31.8
68.9

44.9

55.1

Circuit

Average

53 Six Circuits have a presumption against publication. See 1ST CM. R. app. B(a) (explicit); THm CmcuIrr PLAN paras. 1, 2 (with regard to per curiam opinions, but not with
regard to signed opinions); 4TH Cm R. 18(a) (implicit); SIXTH Cmcurr PLAN para. 2 (explicit); 7TH Cm. R. 35(a) (explicit); 9TH Cm. R. 21(a), (b) (implicit).
I There are, of course, other possible explanations for these variations. It should be
noted that in general the circuits with presumptions against publication are larger than the
circuits without such presumptions. (See the figures in Table 1 supra.) The size of the circuit and the accompanying administrative burdens may have an effect on the judges' tendency to publish. Some doubt is cast on this proposition by the high publication percentage

The University of Chicago Law Review

[48:573

3. Who Makes the Decision. Frequency of publication also
might be affected by who makes the publication decision. Some
circuits require a majority decision to publish, 55 while others permit a single judge to require publication.56 It is plausible that circuits that permit a positive publication decision by a single judge
would publish a higher percentage of their opinions than circuits
that require a majority. Table 5 provides only mild support for
TABLE 5
PUBLICATION RELATED TO DECISION TO PUBLISH
CIRCUITS THAT REQUIRE A MAJORITY FOR A DECISION TO PUBLISH

Circuit

Published (%)

Unpublished (%)

First
Third
Seventh
Ninth
Tenth

59.3
18.1
30.6
33.3
31.1

40.7
81.9
69.4
66.7
68.9

34.5

65.5

Average

CIRCUITS THAT PERMIT A DECISION TO PUBLISH BY A SINGLE JUDGE

(%)

Circuit

Published

D.C.
Second
Fourth
Fiftha
Sixth
Eighth

27.8
38.9
28.0
58.6
27.2
68.2

72.2
61.1
72.0
41.4
72.8
31.8

41.4

58.6

Average

Unpublished (%)

a Although 5TH CIR. R. 21 does not explicitly address the issue, it has been construed as
requiring a unanimous decision not to publish. See NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 430 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1970).

that the largest circuit, the Fifth, displays. Because the Fifth Circuit is also the only one of
the six largest circuits without a presumption against publication, its high publication percentage seems to support the conclusion in the text.
See lsT Cm. R. app. B(b)(4); THIRD CIRcUIT PLAN pares. 1, 2; 7TH CiR. R. 35(d)(1);
9TH Cm. R. 21(d); 10TH CI. R. 17(c).
"See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT PLAN; 4TH CIR. R. 18(b) (author or majority de-
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that hypothesis. The one-vote circuits publish an average of 41.4%
of their opinions, while majority-vote circuits publish 34.5%. It is

difficult to assume any sort of causal connection from such a small
differential.5
IV.

RESULTS OF THE STUDY: AN EMPmIC

ASSESSMENT OF COSTS

AND BENEFITS

A.

Benefits

The major impetus for the limited publication movement has
been the dramatically increasing caseload of the circuit courts.
Limited publication can help the judges to deal with the glut, it is
argued, because an unpublished opinion takes much less judicial
time and effort to prepare than a published opinion.8 If nonpublication does result in significant savings, those savings should be
revealed in two ways: swifter justice and increased judicial
productivity.
1. Swifter Justice. If justice delayed is justice denied, then
swifter justice obviously is an important goal. At the appellate

level, the speed of justice can be measured by the number of days
between the time at which the record was complete and the date of
cides); SIXTH CiRcurr PLAN para. 2; 8TH CmR. R. app. para. 3. See also 2D Cm. R. 0.23 (requiring a unanimous decision not to publish).
57 There are two other related issues. First, four circuits permit a judge who writes a
separate opinion to publish even if a panel majority votes not to. DsTruCr OF COLUMBIA
Cmcurr PLAN; 7TH Cm. R. 35(d)(2) (permitting, but advising against, such publication); Sm
Cm. R. app. para. 3; 9TH Cm. R. 21(b)(6). Those four circuits publish slightly more frequently than do the other seven (40% to 37.3%, computed from the percentages in Table 2
supra). Because of the extreme scarcity of unpublished separate opinions, see text at note
131 infra, it is not surprising that these provisions have no significant effect on publication
percentages. They may be useful, however, because they help ensure against arbitrariness on
the part of a majority.
Second, two circuits will entertain requests by persons outside the court for publication
of certain decisions. 7TH Cm. R. 35(d)(3); 9TH Cm. R. 21(f). This, too, is a useful concept.
Although we have suggested previously that the practice may favor institutional litigants,
Non-PrecedentialPrecedent, supra note 4, at 1178-79, that may not be the case. In the
Seventh Circuit, 21 requests for publication from outsiders were received by the Seventh
Circuit. The Court honored most of the requests, which came from a disparate group. Letter
to authors from Thomas Strubbe, Clerk (Oct. 7, 1980) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review). The Ninth Circuit has a variation authorizing staff law clerks to recommend the publication of appropriate decisions. Heilman, CentralStaff in Appellate Courts:
The Experience of the Ninth Circuit,68 CALIF. L. Rzv. 937, 949-50 (1980). This practice
appears to lead to a minimal increase in publication rates, if any. The two circuits allowing
it publish 32.5% of their opinions, while the other nine publish 39.7%.
" STANARDS, supra note 17, at 5.
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the final judgment-turn-around time, for short. Table 6 suggests
that nonpublication promotes swifter justice. As the table shows,
turn-around time is considerably shorter if an opinion is not published. One out of every five unpublished opinions took no longer
than three months to resolve, for example, but only one out of
every thirty-three published cases was decided that quickly. Almost half of the unpublished opinions had a turn-around time of
half a year or less; the comparable figure for published opinions
was one-fifth.
TABLE 6
TIME FOR DECISION

Turn-Around
Time (Days)a

0-10
11-30
31-60
61-90
91-120
121-150
151-180
181-360
360 or more

Published

0.3
0.4
1.0
2.2
3.8
6.0
6.9
36.7
42.6

(%)

Unpublished

(%)

3.8
3.0
6.4
7.4
7.8
10.0
9.9
31.1
20.7

SOURCE: Compiled from data on 11,487 cases disposed of during the 1978-1979 Reporting
Year for which data were available. StatisticalData, supra note 35, Tables 6P, 6U.
a Measured by the interval between the day the record was complete and the date of final
judgment.

Although there can be no doubt that cases culminating in unpublished opinions are resolved more quickly, it is impossible to
determine how much of that saving can be attributed to limited
publication. Much may be because unpublished litigation is easier
to decide. By definition, it contains nothing that requires the creation of precedent. Whether published or not, it can be disposed of
without the extra work needed to justify the creation and explain
the application of new law.
Nevertheless, anyone who reads even a small number of unpublished opinions must conclude, given their brevity and informality, that considerable effort has been spared in their prepara-
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tion. Of course, one can then ask whether too much effort was
spared. That is, does the quality of decision making suffer when
the judges determine that an opinion need not be published and
therefore that only a truncated opinion need be written? Before
asking that question, however, the relation between publication
and productivity must be examined.
2. Increased Productivity. If saving time and judicial effort
in order to improve the courts' ability to handle a heavier caseload
is the major goal of limited publication, the practice presumably
should increase judicial productivity.59 It is easier to determine
whether this is so if we limit ourselves to an investigation of the
correlation between each circuit's use of limited publication and its
relative judicial productivity. In other words, do the circuits that
publish a comparatively small portion of their opinions have a
comparatively good record of productivity? 0 Before that question
can be addressed, the concept of productivity must be defined.
Typically, judicial productivity is measured in terms of dispositions per authorized judgeship." That technique is unsatisfactory
for two reasons. First, measuring productivity by authorized, but
unfilled, judgeships does not produce very instructive comparisons.
This is particularly true given our data, because authorized judgeships were increased from 97 to 132 during the study year.62 Because none of the new judgeships was filled during the study year,
59 Of course, it is entirely possible that limited publication saves time but that the savings do not result in increased productivity. For example, instead of being spent in writing
more decisions, the extra time could be invested in fashioning better-crafted opinions, or in
more thought on the most difficult cases on the court's docket.
" Whether there is any relation between changes in a circuit's limitation of publication
from year to year and increases or decreases in productivity is, of course, also relevant to
determining limited publication's impact on productivity. That question is beyond the scope
of our study because we have data from all the circuits but for only one fiscal year. In other
words, we have investigated the horizontal question, but not the vertical one. Both methods
of attack are pursued by Professor Daniel Hoffman of the University of Vermont in an
unpublished article. D. Hoffman, Nonpublication of Federal Appellate Court Opinions 12
(1978) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review). Professor Hoffman's instructive work differs from ours in two other respects as well: (1) In determining publication/
nonpublication rates, he used a population of "cases decided after argument or submissions." For reasons given in note 45 supra, our test population is the larger group of "cases
decided with judicial action." (2) He used "dispositions per authorized judgeship" as a measure of productivity. For reasons given in text at notes 61-63 infra, we have used "corrected
dispositions per judge" as the measure.
'1 See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 45.

62 Id. at 44.
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using the traditional measure could skew the results significantly.
Accordingly, we chose to evaluate productivity by using the number of active circuit judges instead of the number of authorized
judgeships. A second difficulty with the standard measure of productivity is that the circuits use visiting and senior circuit judges
to decide cases."3 That practice tends to skew productivity comparisons because the several circuits use visiting and senior judges to
varying extents. Furthermore, if not compensated for, it would
make total dispositions per active judgeship an inflated measure of
productivity. We have corrected for these difficulties by subtracting from a circuit's total number of dispositions the share attributable to visiting and senior judges. Combining these two innovations, we measure productivity not by dispositions per
authorized judgeship, but by dispositions per active circuit judge,
corrected for the participation of senior and visiting judges: "corrected dispositions per judge," for short.
We now return to the central question: Is productivity positively correlated with nonpublication? The first column of Table 7
lists the circuits in order of productivity, from most corrected dispositions per judge to least. The second lists each circuit's corrected dispositions per judge. The third column gives the percentage of each circuit's total opinion production that was not
published. Columns two and three show a positive correlation 6 of
0.097, indicating that there is scant tendency for circuits that publish less to produce more.
Our data thus provide no support for the hypothesis that limited publication enhances productivity. 5 It must be borne in mind,
however, that limiting publication is only one of a host of variables
that may affect productivity. The low productivity figures for the
District of Columbia Circuit and the Second Circuit, for example,
might well be attributable more to the great variety and complexity of the regulatory and commercial appeals that those courts
must decide than to their publication habits. Other variables inId. at 50-51.
" A correlation is a report of the coincidence of two phenomena: x and y. A positive
correlation coefficient indicates that the value of the x variable increases in proportion to
the value of the y variable. The correlation coefficients discussed in this article were computed with the Spearman Rho formula. Significance was tested with standard significance
tables. See generally D. HARNmr & J. MuRPHY, INTRODUarORY STATISTICAL ANALYSls ch. 12
(2d ed. 1980).
"' Professor Hoffman's study also found essentially no relationship between nonpublication and productivity. See D. Hoffman, supra note 60, at 11-26.
43
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clude the percentage of cases that are argued orally,6 6 the extent to
which central staff is used to prepare opinions, and the geographical size of the circuit.67 Absent the ability to control or even quantify some of those variables, it is impossible to be certain of the
effect of limited publication on productivity.
TABLE 7
PRODUCTIVITY AND PUBLICATION

Circuit

Productivity
(Corrected Dispositions
per Judge)a

Unpublished Opinions

Fourth

140.9

72.0

Fifth

138.6

41.4

Sixth

113.2

72.8

Third

108.4

81.9

Seventh

106.4

69.4

Tenth

(%)

101.4

68.9

First

99.2

40.7

Ninth

84.7

66.7

Secondb

76.0

61.1

Eighth

72.0

31.8

D.C.

61.6

72.2

a Calculated from dispositions per circuit in Table 1 supra; participation by senior and
visiting judges in ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 51; and number of active circuit judges
in id. at 45.
b Because only the Second Circuit issues an appreciable number of oral opinions, its total
dispositions from Table 1 were increased by 195 oral opinions. Calculated by the authors
from data supplied by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.

66 Oral argument takes time, of course. In addition, it can be a bottleneck in the appellate process, because a court operating by traditional procedures cannot decide more cases
than it can hear, and there are physical limitations on the number of cases it can hear. See
P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 3, at 19. Some courts have reported dramatic increases in output after establishing a system of curtailed oral argument.
See Huth v. Southern Pac. Co., 417 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1969).
6, Geography plays an important role in relative judicial productivity. Travel time is
much greater in some circuits than in others.
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B. Costs of Limited'Publication
The sections that follow examine the costs of limited publication. Two of those costs, suppression of precedent and diminished
quality, accompany the benefits of swifter justice and savings of
judicial effort. A third is the disparate impact of nonpublication,
leading to the concern that some classes of litigants may be denied
equal access to the courts. A final cost is systemic: the ultimate
effect of limited publication is to transform the courts of appeals
into certiorari courts in some instances.
1. Opinion Quality. Anyone who has read a large number of
unpublished opinions must conclude that they are, as a group, far
inferior in quality to the opinions found in the FederalReporter.
Although judgments about quality are largely subjective, some
quantification of the differences between published and unpublished opinions is possible.
a. Length. Proponents of limited publication argue that time
can be saved in the preparation of opinions that will not be published because they need not contain complete recitations of the
facts or exhaustive discussions of the relevant legal principles.6 8
Hence, unpublished opinions should be considerably shorter than
their published counterparts. 9 This is confirmed by Tables 8 and
9. In every circuit, more than 55% of all unpublished opinions
See STANDARDS, supra note 17, at 5.
69 For obvious reasons, we were unable to perform evaluations on the total of nearly
8000 unpublished opinions produced during the Reporting Year, see text and notes at notes
42-45 supra. Accordingly, we chose a stratified sample of about 10% of the unpublished
opinions for that portion of the study; the population of that sample is shown in Table A.
The sample was "stratified" in this sense: For each termination reported by the Administrative Office there is also a "Method of Disposition" reported. It can be (1) written
opinion, (2) memorandum decision, (3) decided from the bench, (4) by court order without
opinion, (5) by consent, or (6) other. See J.S. 34, box 12. We stratified our sample by ensuring that the 10% of the total population included 10% of the cases decided by each of
methods 1, 2, 4, and 6. We did so because we believed that there might be differences in
quality based on method of disposition. We eliminated cases decided by methods 3 and 5
because they did not result in written case-dispositive orders resulting from judicial action,
and hence could not be evaluated for quality or measured for length.
Our sample was not exactly 10%. It varied from circuit to circuit for three reasons.
First, the selections were made from a preliminary list of terminations-really docket numbers-prepared for us by the Administrative Office. Not every docket number represents an
opinion; because some cases are consolidated for argument or opinion, several docket numbers may produce only one opinion. Hence, our original selection of 10% of docket numbers
actually produced a sample of opinions that typically was closer to 12% of the total opinion
population. Second, some of the opinions that we requested from the circuit court clerks
were never sent. Third, some opinions originally listed as unpublished were later published.
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TABLE 8
LENGTH OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS

Below
50 Words

50-99
Words

100-299
Words

300-499
Words

500Words

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

D.C.

45.2

28.6

16.7

7.2

2.4

First

25.0

12.5

43.8

16.3

12.6

Second

45.4

20.4

23.4

7.8

3.2
3.3

Circuit

Third

70.3

19.4

5.6

1.1

Fourth

42.9

15.6

21.5

9.6

10.8

Fifth

62.5

7.0

17.2

9.1

4.0

Sixth

6.0

22.6

61.9

8.4

1.2

Seventh

7.6

15.1

37.6

11.3

29.0

Eighth

15.8

21.0

31.6

10.6

21.1

Ninth

43.2

9.1

18.0

14.4

15.4

Tenth

13.0

22.3

20.4

11.2

33.4

SouRcE: Stratified sample of the 7720 unpublished opinions in StatisticalData, supra note
35, Table 5U. See Table A and note 69 supra.
NoTE: Figures for each circuit may not add up to 100% because of rounding.
(footnote 69 continued)
TABLE A
SAMPLE POPULATION

Circuit

Number of Unpublished
Opinions Analyzed

Percentage of Total
Unpublished Dispositions

D.C.
First
Second

61
17
71

12.1
11.6
12.6

Third

123

12.4

Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth

92
101
96
92
25
146
67

10.3
10.3
10.6
12.5
12.0
11.8
12.1

Total

891
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TABLE 9
LENGTH OF PUBLISHED OPINIONS

Below
500 Words

500-999
Words

1000-2999
Words

3000-4999
Words

5000Words

D.C.

3.3

15.0

50.0

15.0

16.7

First

2.7

26.0

52.1

15.1

4.2

11.1

12.4

51.7

18.0

6.7

4.2

14.9

50.0

17.6

13.6

23.4

29.9

33.8

9.1

3.9

Fifth

18.8

24.2

43.6

7.3

6.0

Sixth

30.1

16.4

39.8

11.0

2.7

Circuit

(%)

Second
Third
Fourth

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

4.5

11.4

73.9

4.5

5.7

Eighth

16.8

29.8

48.1

4.6

0.8

Ninth

18.5

24.6

44.7

10.6

1.8

Tenth

3.2

28.1

61.0

7.9

0.0

Seventh

SOURCE: Calculated from all opinions reported in volumes 595-600 of FederalReporter (2d).
Those six volumes contained substantial numbers of opinions from the survey year.
NOTE: Figures for each circuit may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

were shorter than 300 words. In six circuits, more than 40% of the
unpublished opinions were shorter than 100 words. Published
opinions, by contrast, are considerably longer. In nine of the eleven
circuits more than 80% of all published opinions exceeded 500
words. In all eleven circuits, the largest group of published opinions was the group between 1000 and 3000 words. If we can safely
assume that a relatively long opinion takes more time to prepare
than a relatively short one, the claim that limited publication saves
time is justified. 70
b. Minimum standards.Not only are unpublished opinions
shorter, they are so short that they raise serious questions concern70 If limited publication in fact saves time, but is not correlated with increased productivity, see text and notes at notes 64-65 supra,we are left with two alternate hypotheses: (1)
the judges do not translate the time saved into extra dispositions, see note 59 supra; or (2)
the other variables that affect productivity, see text and notes at notes 66-67 supra, conceal
the effect of limited publication.
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ing the exercise of judicial responsibility. Does an opinion shorter
than fifty words, often only a sentence or two, satisfy the court's
institutional obligation?
To answer that question one must first consider the essential
characteristics of the judicial opinion. At rock bottom, it must announce the result to the parties and explain to them the court's
reasoning.7 1 It should also explain the result to a higher court and
thus facilitate review.7 2 A final purpose is to "provide the stuff of
the law": 7 3 rules of law, interpretations of statutes and constitutions, and declarations of public policy. Because the opinion publication plans clearly indicate that unpublished opinions are not
designed to accomplish the "lawmaking" function, the present inquiry can be limited to whether unpublished opinions perform the
first two functions satisfactorily.
A substantial consensus exists concerning the minimum standards that an opinion must meet if it is to perform those two functions adequately. One formulation states that even a memorandum
decision must contain at least three elements: (1) the identity of
the case decided; (2) the ultimate disposition; and (3) the reasons
for the result. In addition, it is often desirable that the issues be
stated explicity.7 4 How well6 these standards were met by our sample is shown in Table 10.7
71

See STANDARDS, supra note 17, at 2.

72

Id. at 2-3.

The phrase is from Leflar, Sources of Judge-MadeLaw, 24 OKLA. L. RFv. 319 (1971).
74 P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 3, at 34. In addition, the
73

American Bar Association recommends that
[e]very decision should be supported, at minimum, by a citation of the authority or
statement of grounds upon which it is based. When the lower court decision was based
on a written opinion that adequately expresses the appellate court's view of the law,
the reviewing court should incorporate that opinion or such portions of it as are
deemed pertinent, or, if it has been published, affirm on the basis of that opinon.
ABA COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JuDiciL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO AP58 (1977). Karl Llewellyn said much the same thing.
The deciding is, in the main, done under felt pressure or even compulsion to follow
up with a published "opinion" which tells any interested person what the cause is and
why the decision-under the authorities--is right, and perhaps why it is wise.

PELLATE COURTS

This opinion is addressed also to the losing party and counsel in an effort to make
them feel at least that they have had a fair break.
K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 26 (1960). One survey of attorneys found that
more than two-thirds of the respondents believed that "the due process clause of the Constitution should be held to require courts of appeals to write 'at least a brief statement of
the reasons for their decisions."' HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 18, at 49 (quoting a survey
undertaken by the Commission).
71 An opinion was listed as meeting minimum standards if it gave some indication of
what the case was about and some statement of the reasons for the decision. Often a single
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TABLE 10
SATISFACTION OF MINIMUM STANDARDS IN UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS

Circuit

Reasoned Opinions (%)

D.C.

34.1

First
Second

Decided on the

No Discernible

Basis of the
Opinion Below (%)

Justification
(%)

4.9

61.0

68.8

6.3

25.0

45.3

23.4

31.3

Third

13.6

1.1

85.2

Fourth

46.0

41.0

13.0

Fifth

36.0

5.0

59.0

Sixth

71.5

7.0

21.5

Seventh

77.5

1.3

21.3

Eighth

57.9

5.3

36.8

Ninth

65.8

0.0

34.2

Tenth

79.6

13.0

7.4

SOURCE: Compiled by the authors from the stratified sample in Table A supra. See note 75

supra.
NOTE: Figures for each circuit may not add up to 100% because of rounding.

Three circuits recorded double-digit percentages in the second
category, cases decided on the basis of the opinion below. That sort
of opinion provides a satisfactory explanation of the result to the
parties, at least to the extent that the opinion below gives reasons
for the result. By and large, the explanation is adequate only with
respect to the parties, because most district court and administrative agency decisions are not published or readily accessible. Thus,
the bar and the general public rarely will be able to oversee appellate decisions that culminate in a decision by reference. Another
drawback to a decision by reference is that it may leave litigants
citation of precedent was considered satisfactory if the precedent was narrowly directed to
the problem at hand; a citation to the general standard of review of an administrative or
district court decision was not considered sufficient. Also considered insufficient to meet
minimum standards were baldly conclusory opinions such as "appellants contentions are
frivolous and without merit," or "the conviction is supported by substantial evidence."
The reliability of the coding of opinions was established as follows: Each of the authors,
using the coding method described above, applied it independently to all of the opinions in
the sample. We agreed on 88% of the opinions for all circuits.
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with the feeling that the appellate court never really gave the case
a fresh look. A short statement of the reasons for the decision in
the appellate court's own words provides more evidence that serious thought has gone into the decision than does a blanket approval of the opinion below.

It is the third category, decisions with no discernible justification, that raises the issue of judicial irresponsibility most strik-

ingly.7 6 A decision without articulated reasons might well be a decision without reasons or one with inadequate or impermissible
reasons. That is not to suggest that judges will be deliberately arbi-

trary or decide cases without adequate grounds. The discipline of
providing written reasons, however, often will show weaknesses or

inconsistencies in the intended decision that may compel a change
in the rationale or even in the ultimate result. Even if judges con-

scientiously reach correct results, an opinion that does not disclose
its reasoning is unsatisfactory. Justice must not only be done, it
must appear to be done. The authority of the federal judiciary

rests upon the trust of the public and the bar. Courts that articulate no reasons for their decisions undermine that trust by creating

the appearance of arbitrariness.
The decision without discernible justification takes various
forms in the several circuits. Perhaps the most flagrant failure to
provide reasons occurs in the Fifth Circuit. A substantial number
of unpublished decisions by the court read simply "Affirmed. See
Local Rule 21.''7 The District of Columbia Circuit decides some
cases "substantially upon the basis of the opinion below," a prac7' The practice of deciding cases with no articulated reasons has been roundly condemned by commentators, lawyers, and judges. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 4, at 451-52
(testimony of Edward Hickey, President, Bar Association of the Seventh Circuit); id. at 555
(testimony of Willard Lassers on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union and the
Chicago Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law); id. at 826 (testimony of Judge
Doyle of the Tenth Circuit); id. at 933 (testimony of Professor Haworth); id. at 951 (testimony of Professor Carrington); id. at 1107 (testimony of Judge Skelton of the Court of
Claims); Note, supra note 4,at 134-35.
11 5TH CR.R. 21 authorizes such a truncated order when the court finds
(1) that a judgment of the District Court is based on findings of fact which are not
clearly erroneous, (2) that the evidence in support of a jury verdict is not insufficient,
(3) that the order of an administrative agency is supported by substantial evidence on
the record as a whole; and the Court also determines that no error of law appears and
an opinion would have no precedential value, the judgment or order may be affirmed or
enforced without opinion.
Affirming under this rule thus is not a decision by reference, but simply a declaration that
the decision below was not wrong. Furthermore, the failure even to refer to the opinion
below adds another layer of obscurity to the decisional process.
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tice even less satisfactory than the usual decision by reference because it does not indicate which portions of the opinion below are
accepted and which are rejected. The Third Circuit produces a
large number of opinions that simply list the appellant's contentions and then order that the judgment be affirmed. That practice,
although perhaps more instructive than a one-word affirmance,
gives no indication why each contention was rejected, nor does it
give any indication that the court gave any serious thought to the
appellant's brief. Several circuits employ what might best be described as form orders or judgments." These orders recite that "after due consideration" or "upon a review of the record and the
briefs of the parties," the "appeal is dismissed as frivolous" or "appellant's contentions are without merit."
C. Quality and Productivity
The percentage of below-standard unpublished opinions varies
greatly among the circuits, from a high of 85 % in the Third Circuit
to a low of 7% in the Tenth Circuit. It might be expected that
those circuits with the highest percentage of below-standard unpublished opinions are the most overworked. That is, short opinions may be necessary in order to permit those courts to keep up to
date. The data in Table 11, however, suggest that such is not the
case.
The first column lists the circuits in order of productivity."
The second displays the percentage of below-standard unpublished
opinions.80 The data show no positive correlation.81 In other words,
78

order.
70

The Second, Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits make some use of the formula type
See Table 7 supra.

80 See Table 10 supra.

"1In fact the correlation was negative: -.140. Another way to test the hypothesis that
very short opinions are necessary to high productivity is to correlate productivity with the
percentage of minimum standard opinions produced. That would remedy a possible defect
in Table 11. The Second Circuit and the Fourth Circuit show relatively low percentages
both of below-standard opinions and of minimum standard opinions. See Table 10 supra.
This is the result of high percentages of decisions by reference. It may be that the lack of
correlation in Table 11 is caused by the fact that the most productive circuit, the Fourth,
relies to a large extent on decisions by reference. This difficulty can be eliminated by correlating the percentage of minimum standard opinions with productivity. If the hypothesis
that short opinions are necessary to productivity is correct, we should find a strong negative
correlation. Once again the hypothesis is not proved. As shown in Table B, there is a negative correlation, but it is quite weak: -.047.
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TABLE 11
PRODUCTIVITY AND BELOW-STANDARD UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS

Circuit

Productivity (Corrected

Percentage of

Dispositions per Judge)

Unpublished Opinions
That Are Below
Standard

Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Third

140.9

13.0

138.6
113.2
108.4

59.0
21.5
85.2

Seventh
Tenth
First

106.4
101.4
99.2

21.3
7.4
25.0

Ninth
Second
Eighth
D.C.

84.7
76.0
72.0
61.6

34.2
31.3
36.8
61.0

SouRce: Tables 7, 10 supra.
(footnote 81 continued)
TABLE B
PRODUCTIVITY AND MINIMUM STANDARD OPINIONS

Circuit

Productivity (Corrected
Dispositions per Judge)

Percentage of Unpublished
Opinions That Meet
Minimum Standards

Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Third
Seventh
Tenth
First
Ninth
Second
Eighth
D.C.

140.9
138.6
113.2
108.4
106.4
101.4
99.2
84.7
76.0
72.0
61.6

46.0
36.0
71.5
13.6
77.5
79.6
68.8
65.8
45.3
57.9
34.1

SOURCE: Tables 7, 10 supra.
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the most productive circuits were not the ones that produced the
most substandard opinions.s2
The use by the circuits of excessively brief opinions with no
discernible justification cannot be supported. The cost of this practice is high; use of such opinions subverts many of the goals of
appellate justice. The benefit of the practice is doubtful at best;
the data reveal no correlation between productivity and the use of
cryptically short opinions.
2. Suppressed Precedent. The lower quality of unpublished
opinions may be the most important of the costs of limited publication, but it has not been the most controversial. That role has
been played by the question of suppressed precedent8s By suppressed precedent, we mean a case that ought to have been pub8

Nor did the most productive circuits produce the most very short unpublished opin-

ions, as is shown in the table below
TABLE C
PRODUCTIVITY AND VERY SHORT OPINIONS

Circuit

Productivity (Corrected

Percentage of Unpublished

Dispositions per Judge)

Opinions That Are Shorter
than 50 Words

Fourth
Fifth
Sixth

140.9
138.6
113.2

42.9
62.5
6.0

Third

108.4

70.3

Seventh
Tenth

106.4
101.4

7.6
13.0

First

99.2

25.0

Ninth
Second
Eighth
D.C.

84.7
76.0
72.0
61.6

43.2
45.4
15.8
45.2

SouRcz Tables 8, 10 supra.

Again the correlation is weak: .151.
As might be expected, there is a high positive correlation between the percentage of
below-standard opinions and the percentage of opinions shorter than 50 words: .758, as is
shown in Table D.

For an explanation of how correlations are calculated and their significance, see note 64
supra.
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lished but was not.84 Our examination has convinced us, however,
that suppressed precedent is not an insuperable problem of limited
publication. The discussion that follows examines the problem of
suppressed precedent generally and in the specific contexts of reversals and separate opinions.
a. Generally. Our sample of unpublished opinions 5 revealed
a number of instances of suppressed precedent. It is difficult to
estimate how widespread the phenomenon was. An opinion that
relies on no authority, for example, could be said to be breaking
new ground, or it may only be that the issue is so well settled that
citation would be superfluous.86 To determine with any certainty
whether an opinion makes new law requires a familiarity with the
substantive law of the circuits that is far beyond the scope of this
study. The problem of identifying suppressed precedent becomes
even more acute when one considers that discussions of "settled"
law in novel settings may in fact shift the moorings of the "settled"
principles. Detection of such nuances is difficult. Nevertheless,
some conclusions can be drawn with reasonable assurance.
(footnote 82 continued)
TABLE D
BELow-STANDARD OPINIONS AND VERY SHORT OPINIONS

Circuit

Percentage of Unpublished
Opinions That Are Below
Standard

Percentage of Unpublished
Opinions That Are
Shorter than 50 Words

Third
D.C.
Fifth
Eighth
Ninth
Second
First
Seventh
Sixth
Fourth
Tenth

85.2
61.0
59.0
36.8
34.2
31.3
25.0
21.3
21.5
13.0
7.4

70.3
45.2
62.5
15.8
43.2
45.4
25.0
7.6
6.0
42.9
13.0

Souacm Tables 8, 10 supra.
$3 See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 4; Comment, supra note 4.
" Our use of the word "suppressed" is not intended to connote in any way that these
cases are being deliberately concealed.
" See note 69 supra for a description of the sample.
s Or, to put the last point differently, the case may have provided materials for changing the law but the court refused to play the role of artisan.
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We discovered no widespread "hiding" of law-declaring opinions-that is, opinions that clearly broke new ground on important
issues. There were, to be sure, some exceptions. e7 One example is

Trible v. Brown.ss There a Congressman sought to compel the Department of Defense to file a report on two shipyard programs.
The litigation raised interesting questions of standing,e" justiciability, and remedy. In spite of its obvious importance, the
Fourth Circuit did not publish the opinion °
Cases like Trible were unusual. 91 More frequent examples of
suppressed precedent involved questions of state law, often in relation to federal statutory or constitutional law. Such opinions certainly should be published if they resolve novel issues. In DeBona
v. Vizas,02 for example, the Tenth Circuit decided that two policemen had not been denied due process when their positions were
terminated. The decision turned on whether a Colorado statute
created a protected property interest,93 and apparently it was a
case of first impression. The importance of the court's resolution of
the problem was increased because the state statute involved had
not been construed since 1900. In those circumstances, the resolution of the due process claim deserved general circulation. 4
" Eyes more attuned than ours to the subtleties of criminal procedure might have
spotted more "clear" precedent. But the point is there were few cases that grabbed the
attention of the alert general reader. Others who have done more limited studies, particularly in state appellate courts, report reading unpublished opinions that begin, in effect,
"This is a case of first impression in our state." See, e.g., Kanner, supra note 3, at 391;
Newbern & Wilson, supra note 3, at 48-56. We have few such stories to tell.
" No. 79-1228 (4th Cir. May 2, 1979).
" Plaintiff argued that he needed the reports in order to exercise his oversight role
effectively. Compare Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (alleged interference with exercise of legislative power gives Congressmen standing) with Harrison v. Bush,
553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (no standing where Congressman's interest in enforcement of
statute is no greater than that of an ordinary citizen).
9" It may have been held back from publication because it originally was an oral opinion. That does not detract, however, from its status as a law-declaring opinion. It was a
judicial expression on important legal issues.
91 Often an opinion that at first appeared clearly to warrant publication seemed less
important on closer examination. AT&T v. Grady, No. 78-2316 (7th Cir. Dec. 14, 1978),
provides an example. The issue there, whether a nonparty, the federal government, should
be granted a modification of a protective order so it could gain access to discovered documents, was said by the court to have been resolved in different ways by trial courts and to
be "a case of appellate first impression." Id., slip op. at 5. The opinion turned on the particular facts of the case at bar, however, considerably reducing its value as precedent. Although
the discussion probably was significant enough to warrant publication, it was not as important as the court's statements might have led the reader to believe.
9 No. 77-1299 (10th Cir. Dec. 18, 1978).
'4 See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
See also United States ex rel. Aurora Pump Co. v. Ranger Constr. Co., No. 77-1991
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Suppressed precedent can also be found in cases resolving
novel questions of state law. The federal courts' reluctance to publish opinions on state law questions is understandable. Still, such
opinions can provide useful guidance in areas where no state precedent exists. An example is Grant Square Bank & Trust Co. v.
Magnavox Co.,95 a contract case where the court relied in part on
promissory estoppel, but cited no state cases accepting that
doctrine.9 6
Although nonpublication of law-declaring opinions does occur,
our review of the opinions in our sample has convinced us that it is
not a major problem with limited publication. The handful of examples we discovered constituted less than 1% of the nearly 900
97
opinions in our sample.
Perhaps more common than unpublished law-declaring opinions were cases that were of public interest because they revealed
defects in the law or its administration." Those opinions deserved
wider circulation in order to reveal these flaws to a large audience,
which is the best way to ensure their correction.
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation
Act,9 9' for example, was designed to provide employees with "swift
compensation for work-related injuries, regardless of fault, and the
cost of resolving disputes relating to such compensation would be
kept to a minimum." 10 0 Unfortunately, the plan does not always
(4th Cir. Sept. 6, 1978). The question there was whether timely notice was given under the
Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270(b) (1976). The court's sensible construction of the statute was
not supported by any citation. If Aurora Pump was a case of first impression, it should have
been published.
Another example is Hale v. Walker, No. 78-1443 (10th Cir Mar. 12, 1979) (no cause of
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) for failure to expunge an arrest record; court cited no
authority for its holding).
"No. 77-1070 (10th Cir. Sept. 6, 1978).
"See also Gard v. United States, 594 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 1979), which applied the
Nevada sightseer statute, Nsv. Rsv. STAT. § 41.510 (1967), in a case of first impression.
Although originally unpublished, the case subsequently was ordered published, which indicated a commendable, if belated, awareness of the importance of cases of this type.
" See note 69 supra for a description of the sample.
" Several circuits provide expressly for publication of such opinions. The Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, for instance, call for publication of an opinion that "criticizes
existing law." 4TH Ci. R. 18(a)(iii); 7TH Cm R. 35(c)(iii); 9TH CiR R. 21 (b)(3). The District
of Columbia, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits require publication of an opinion
that "involves an issue of continuing public interest." DismTRIcT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUrr PLAN
para. e; 4TH CIR. R. 18(a)(ii); 7TH Cm. R. 35(c)(ii); 8TH CIR. R. app. I 4(d); 9TH Cm. R.
21(b)(4).
" 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1976).
100 Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp. v. Norat, No. 78-1029, slip op. at 2 (3d Cir.
Feb. 8, 1979).
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work that well, as the Third Circuit noted in one unpublished
opinion that described in detail one longshoreman's continuing efforts-eight years after an accident-to obtain relief.10 1 The court
reluctantly remanded to the agency. Publication of this story
might have helped bring about change; certainly its suppression
will not help achieve that goal.
In similar fashion, American Bankers Association v. Connell'02 described problems associated with fund transfers by
financial institutions. The court noted that it was "convinced that
the methods of transfer authorized by the agency regulations have
outpaced the methods and technology of fund transfer authorized
by the existing statute."103 Such a statement from an influential
court could have stimulated reform. Instead, it was not published.
Courts are uniquely situated to spot problems in the application of a statute or the workings of an agency. Their comments on
the subject can enlighten those in a position to act. There is no
reason not to publish those expressions.
A closely related type of case contains commentary by judges
on the workings of their own courts. The judiciary has an institutional obligation to set its own house in order. Judges should not
be permitted to sweep their peers' shortcomings under the rug by
nonpublication. Those who have the duty to supervise the judiciary should see the whole picture, warts and all. Further, public exposure of the faults of judges may have a salutary effect on performance. Reversal in public is a far different matter than what
amounts to a private reprimand in an unpublished opinion.
Several unpublished opinions in our sample involved mistakes
made by district judges that led to reversal or at least admonition
by the circuit court. We believe that those cases should have been
made public. Elementary mistakes in routine cases deserve public
attention; judicial accountability cannot exist if no one but the circuit court is aware of judicial errors. When an appellate court must
remind a district judge of the necessity of subject matter jurisdiction,104 for instance, something is seriously amiss. The same can be
said when a court must reinstate a complaint because it was "dismissed pursuant to a procedure this court reviewed and found def101

Id.

No. 78-1337 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 20, 1979).
Id., slip op. at 2.
'" See Bergeron v. Exxon Corp., No. 78-2318 (5th Cir. Apr. 19, 1979).

10"

103
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cient [the preceding year]." 10 5 Pressure through publicity should
be brought to bear on such trial judges.
The nonpublication of opinions that reveal problems transcending mere mistake is even more objectionable. Such cases give
rise to a strong suspicion that the court does not care to wash its
dirty linen in public. A prime example is United States v. Ritter,106 where the full Tenth Circuit vacated an order issued by
Chief Judge Willis Ritter of the District of Utah. The order in
question prohibited the judge's "court reporter from carrying out
the duties imposed upon him by law. 10°7 The decision came at a
time when Congress was considering a proposal to create a procedure, short of impeachment, to hold federal judges accountable;
the problems of Chief Judge Ritter figured in the debate.10 8 The
scope of the problems he had created clearly should have been revealed to a directly interested Congress and legal community.
Suppression of law-declaring opinions does not appear to be a
major problem of limited publication. That is not surprising, given
our findings concerning the quality of decision making in unpublished opinions. The concern should not be the suppression of precedent; instead, it should be whether the judges examined the
cases closely enough to see if precedent should be made. 10' 9 The
major danger we see is that the early decision not to publish an
opinion means that not enough care will go into its preparation to
stimulate the thought necessary to an adequate consideration of
whether precedent should be created. That basic issue of judicial
responsibility should be the concern of the judiciary and of the
public.
More troublesome than the suppression of law-declaring opinions was the nonpublication of decisions suggesting that statutes,
agencies, or the courts themselves are not performing up to par.
Appellate courts should recognize that they have a unique vantage
point from which to observe the workings of our society. Observations from that point are of interest to all.
105McGruder v. Jeansonne, No. 78-3236 (5th Cir. Mar. 27, 1979). See also Moorer v.
Griffin, No. 77-3580 (6th Cir. Oct. 12, 1978), where the District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute. The Sixth Circuit reversed because the plaintiff was in jail
and the court had not directed that his body be produced for argument.
' No. 77-1491 (10th Cir. Aug. 11, 1978).
107Id., slip op. at 1.

I" S. REP. No. 1035, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978).
1o Some observers have worried that the Seventh Circuit, for example, has suppressed
too many law-declaring opinions. See Hearings, supra note 4, at 556 (statement of Willard
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b. Separate opinions. Nonpublication presents a special
problem when an unpublished opinion contains a concurring or
dissenting opinion. Two major factors argue for publication in
cases that generate separate opinions. First are the stated premises
of limited publication, which is a treatment supposedly reserved
for cases that do not implicate the lawmaking function of the
court 1 1q-routine, uncontroversial cases. Cases that contain dissents or concurrences are, by definition, controversial; the court
disagrees either about the result to be reached or about the
method used to reach it. Accordingly, few decisions with separate
opinions should go unpublished.
Second is the role played by the separate opinion in our judicial system.""' Separate opinions serve to restrain judical advocacy.
Like all advocates, the judicial advocate can lose sight of the other
side. The separate opinion restricts the judicial advocate because it
assures him of a public airing of a contrary view of the same facts
and law. 12 The separate opinion also performs an important corrective function, for it criticizes the result and reasoning of the majority, appealing for correction by a higher court, a future court, or
a legislature. It is "an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to
the intelligence of a later day."1 18
In order to perform these functions adequately, the separate
opinion must be published. 11 ' The judicial advocate will not be reLassers). See also Comment, supra note 4. Our review convinced us that, instead, the Seventh Circuit has a commendable record of explaining its decisions. Some incidental suppres-

sion of precedent in that process seems a legitimate price to pay; it is preferable to a court's
avoiding any risk of suppressing a law-declaring opinion by not providing any reasons for its
unpublished decisions.
110 See STANDARDS, supra note 17, at 1-2.

" See generally W. RoYNOLDs, supranote 6, at 23-27; Fuld, The Voices of Dissent, 62
COLUM. L. Rav. 923, 926-28 (1962); Stephens, The Function of Concurringand Dissenting
Opinions in Courts of Last Resort, 5 U. FLA.L. Rav. 394 (1952).

Stephens, supra note 111, at 403-04.
13 C. HUGHES, THE SuPRmi Couwr op THE UNrrBD STATEs 68 (1928) (describing dissent in courts of last resort).
114One important function of the separate opinion can be accomplished even if the
opinion goes unpublished. Judge Fuld wrote that "the dissent is an assurance that the case
was fully considered and thoroughly argued by the bench as a whole and was not merely
adopted as written by one member." Fuld, supra note 111, at 927. An unpublished dissent
or concurrence may still provide that assurance, at least to the parties and the lower court.
It can, however, fail even that limited function. Consider National Treasury Employees
122

Union v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, No. 78-1282 (D.C. Cir. May 15, 1979). The

opinion reads as follows:
This cause came on to be heard on the record on appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and was argued by counsel. While the issues
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strained by a dissent that never sees the light of day. An appeal for
correction is largely useless if the appeal is not disseminated to
those with the power to correct the majority's errors.11 5
Thus, both the criteria for cases that should remain unpublished and the functions of the separate opinions lead to the conclusion that few cases that generate separate opinions should go
unpublished. The data from the survey year, as illustrated by
Table 12, confirm that hypothesis. The frequency of separate opinions among the circuits' published opinions ranged between 2.8%
and 21.1%; in the unpublished opinions it ranged from a low of
0% to a high of 1.5%. Taking all the circuits together, the average
frequency of separate opinions in published opinions was 12.4%, in
unpublished opinions 0.5%. Divided courts thus were more than
20 times more common in cases decided by published opinions
than in those decided by unpublished opinions.
The important question, however, is whether any case that is
sufficiently controversial to generate a separate opinion should go
unpublished. Of the separate opinions in our sample, two had little
to offer to the legal literature.116 One was too short to evaluate.117
The other two, however, should have been published.
presented occasion no need for an opinion, they have been accorded full consideration
by the Court. See Local Rule 13(c).
On consideration of the foregoing, it is ordered and adjudged by this Court that
the judgment of the District Court appealed from in this case is hereby affirmed.
To that informative recitation, which consists of a printed form with the words "judgment"
and "affirmed" written in, is added the equally terse "Chief Judge Wright dissents." That
sort of opinion complete with dissent not only fails to accomplish the restraining and correcting functions but also fails to assure "that the case was fully considered by the bench as
a whole." It takes 83 words to.say to the appellant "you lost 2-1."
115 Another reason to publish opinions with dissents is to ensure that the majority cannot suppress the views of a dissenting judge. We are not aware of any federal cases where
that has occurred. The problem has arisen in some state cases, however. In People v. Para,
No. CRA 15889 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 1979), Judge Jefferson wrote in dissent:
Initially, it appeared that the majority felt the same as I do regarding the fact that the
majority opinion merited publication in the Official Reports. When circulated to me,
the majority opinion was approved by the two justices making up the majority and was
marked for publication in the Official Reports. It was only after I had circulated my
dissenting opinion to the two justices who make up the majority that they decided to
reverse their original position regarding publication in the Official Reports. I do not
think this reversal of position is justified.
Id. at 34.
,, In Costello Publishing Co. v. Rotelle, No. 79-1019 (D.C. Cir. May 17, 1979), the
district court dismissed the counterclaim under FaD. R. CIv. P. 19(b) because the action "in
equity and good conscience" should not proceed among the present parties due to the
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TABLE 12
SEPARTE OPINIONS

PUBLISHED

Circuit

D.C.
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth

Total
Opinions

Dissenting

Concurring

Concurring
& Dissenting

Separate
Opinions
(%)

194
214

21
2

12
4

8
0

21.1
2.8

359
219
346
1385
340
325
448
618
251

28
26
53
62
13
30
21
14
16

34
10
6
55
5
9
10
2
12

9
4
8
9
6
8
2
9
4

19.8
18.3
19.4
9.1
7.1
14.5
7.4
4.0
12.7

Average

12.4
UNPUBLISHED

Circuit

Total
Opinions

Dissenting

Concurring

Concurring
& Dissenting

Separate
Opinions

(%)
D.C.
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth

505
147
563
991
890
978
908
736
209
1238
555

2
0
1
4
1
0
2
4
1
2
3

1
0
0
1
1
1
2
6
0
0
2

Average
SOURCE: StatisticalData,supra note 35, Tables

1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1

0.8
0.0
0.2
0.5
0.2
0.1
0.4
1.5
0.5
0.2
1.1
0.5

IP, 2P, 3U, 5U.

1981]

Limited Publication

American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Bingham
(ATMI) 11 8 surely deserved public dissemination. It involved an is-

sue that, although arcane, has broad implications. The Occupational Safety and Health Act 11' provides for judicial review by the
circuit courts of safety and health standards. 20 Often petitions for
review will be filed in more than one circuit; the case is then heard
in the circuit in which the first petition was filed. 2 ' A petition fied
before the issuance of the regulation is considered premature. 122 In

ATMI the challenged regulation was delivered to the FederalRegister at 9:00 A.M. and made available to the public at 11:53 A.M.

Several labor organizations filed petitions for review in the District
of Columbia Circuit at 8:45 A.M. and 11:55 A.M. ATMI filed 12at3

8:45:01, 11:00:00 A.M., and exactly noon in the Fourth Circuit.
Clearly, the venue for the appeal will be determined by whether

9:00 A.M. or 11:53 A.M. was the time the regulation was issued. The

dissent, relying on a provision in the statutory authorization for
the Federal Register,1 24 thought that ATMI had filed first. The
25
majority, relying on an interpretive regulation issued by OSHA,

held that the unions had filed first.
court's lack of jurisdiction over a foreign firm that possessed evidence essential to determining the merits. The court of appeals reversed on the theory that the dismissal was premature because FaD. R. Civ. P. 28(b) permits discovery in foreign countries. The correct time
for dismissal, said the court, would be after such efforts at discovery had failed. Judge
MacKinnon concurred; his opinion essentially is a message to the district judge indicating
those factors mentioned in Rule 19(b) that Judge MacKinnon considered especially
important.
United States v. Vera, No. 77-5363, (6th Cir. July 10, 1978), is another case in which the
separate opinion is of only marginal import. The issue that generated Judge Merritt's concurrence was defendant's motion to transfer the case from Kentucky to Texas. Defendant
was engaged in a scheme to distribute marijuana in Kentucky when his airplane crashed and
was captured in Texas. The District court denied the motion to transfer and was affirmed.
Judge Merritt concurred even though he would have felt "more comfortable" had the case
been transferred. Id. at 2. The relevant standard is "for the convenience of parties and
witnesses, and in the interest of justice." FED. R. CaiM. P. 21(b). Vera is an unremarkable
application of that standard.
'" See note 114 supra.
11' No. 78-1378 (4th Cir. Oct. 3, 1978).
119 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
120 Id. § 655(f).
1 23 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (1976).
122 See Industrial Union Dep't v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965, 968-69 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
The statement of the facts is taken from Respondent Secretary's Motion to Dismiss
M11
and to Transfer, ATMI v. Bingham, No. 78-1378 (4th Cir. July 11, 1978) (on file with The
University of Chicago Law Review).
2'
44 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976) (documents to be publicly available immediately after

filing).
25 29 C.F.R.

§ 1911.18(d) (1980).
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The majority and dissent, then, disagreed upon a rule of
law-a rule that could be settled one way or the other without
shaking the legal firmament, but a rule that should be settled.
Publication would have advanced the ultimate national resolution
of this issue.
Another case that should have been published is Burrison v.
New York City Transit Authority,126 which revealed a longstanding disagreement within a circuit. The issue was the res judicata
effect of findings in a state criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding
upon a subsequent federal civil rights litigation. In Burrison and
other cases, Judge Oakes has consistently favored a much narrower
scope for the doctrine of res judicata than has the majority. 12 7 The
issue has also caused a split between the Second Circuit and the
Sixth Circuit, 1 8 and it has been the subject of scholarly dispute.1 29
It seems odd that, faced with such a controversial question, the
court should not treat the issues in comprehensive fashion 30 and
publish that treatment. Nonpublication surely is inappropriate for
cases concerning such a persistently troublesome issue.
It might be argued that the controversial issues in Burrison
had already been treated by the court in published opinions. Additional publication of dissenting views arguably is unnecessary, as
well as damaging to the collegiality of the court. But frequent public airing of disagreement is the only way to settle such stubborn
disputes, and it may be the only way to attract sufficient attention
from the Supreme Court to provoke a grant of certiorari.
After considering the principles underlying limited publication
and separate opinions, it seems clear that the circuits should adopt
No. 78-7536 (2d Cir. Mar. 29, 1979).
See Turco v. Monroe County Bar Ass'n, 554 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.) (in which Judge
Oakes disagreed with the majority, but concurred in the result because he felt he was bound
by the "law of the circuit," id. at 522), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Thistlethwaite v.
XU

New York, 497 F.2d 339, 343 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093
(1974); Tank v. Appellate Div., 487 F.2d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 1973) (Oakes, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974).
128 See Getty v. Reed, 547 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1977).
" See H. FRIENDLY, FFDHRAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL ViEw 101-02 & n.113 (1973);
Theis, Res Judicatain Civil Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to the Problem, 70 Nw. U.

L. Rsv. 859 (1976).
"0 The problem here is really more serious than nonpublication; the court's opinion
contains about 120 words. The facts are omitted entirely and the entire legal discussion
consists of three case citations. Judge Oakes joined the majority opinion, limiting his disagreement to the statement that he adhered to his position in Turco. This may well be an
instance where nonpublication led to a case receiving less attention than it merited.
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the rule that all cases containing separate opinions should be published. Such a rule would cost little. In the survey year, only thirtyeight separate opinions went unpublished-0.5% of the total unpublished product of the circuit courts."' 1 In return for the minimal cost of publishing these few decisions, the courts would be able
to ensure publication of a group of opinions that should be available to guide litigants and planners, provoke critical commentary,
and perhaps interest the Supreme Court in resolving a controversial question.
c. Reversals. About one in every seven unpublished opinions
did something other than affirm the opinion below (see Table 13).
TABLE 13
FREQUENCY oF NONAFFIRMANCE

In Published

Circuit

Opinions (%)

In Unpublished

Opinions (%)

Number of

Nonaffirming
Unpublished
Opinions

D.C.
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth

44
32
37
50
43
36
41
38
28
28
29

14
12
9
8
14
11
12
16
17
19
15

Total

36

14

67
17
51
77
121
109
111
118
35
231
81
1018

SOURCE: Calculated from StatisticalData, supra note 35, Tables IP, 5U.
NOTE: Dismissals for want of prosecution and cases transferred were excluded from both
numerator and denominator in computing the percentages of nonaffirmance. The former
figure comprised all instances in which the appellate court did anything other than affirm
the opinion below or dismiss the appeal. Opinions coded "affirmed in part and reversed in
.part" thus were classified as nonaffirmances.

131

See Table 12 supra.
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It should not be surprising that the rate of nonaffirmance in published cases is nearly three times that figure. With few exceptions,
when one court reverses another, it means that the system has not
worked properly. Almost by definition, the opinion on appeal is of
sufficient interest to warrant publication.
Some reversals reflect mistakes in routine matters on the part
of district judges. The inability of judges to apply commonplace
law correctly should be a matter of concern to all.132 Including such
reversals among the unpublished opinions conceals the problem.
Earlier, we discussed several examples of unpublished opinions
correcting plain error by the trial judge. 138 Another is Wesley v.
Green.1 34 The trial court had dismissed a complaint because venue
was improperly laid, without establishing in the record the parties'
residences. Any such error, however embarrassing, should not be
kept from public scrutiny.1 3 5

Reversal on routine matters may signify more than poor
craftsmanship by the trial judge. It may, for example, point to uncertainty about the content of governing law. The court of appeals
may not publish a reversal because, to it, the governing law was
clear; such may not be the perception of others. Put differently,
the unpublished opinion may clarify precedent to such a degree
that the opinion should be published. Sanchez v. Califano3 e was
such a case. Its outcome turned on the allocation of the burden of
proof in Social Security disability cases. The court of appeals
thought the issue determined by its own published precedent. Although the court probably was correct, the precedent was hardly a
"' The

major concern, of course, is a general interest in the quality of justice being

dispensed. There may also be a more specific concern, however. An example would be a trial

judge under consideration for elevation to a higher bench; if his reversal rate were abnormally high it might cause second thought. A high reversal rate was one of the problems that

plagued Judge Carswell when he was nominated to the Supreme Court. See N.Y. Times,
Mar. 6, 1970, at 24, col. 8.
3 See text and notes at notes 104-108 supra.
"I No. 77-2269 (4th Cir. Oct. 17, 1978). See also Dawn v. Wenzler, No. 76-3457 (9th
Cir. Dec. 5, 1978) (failure to permit plaintiff to amend complaint once, which is a matter of
right under FED. R. Cv. P. 15(a)).

15 A similar analysis applies to mistakes by federal law enforcement officials. Even a
remand based on confession of error by the United States Attorney can be interesting

enough to warrant publication. United States v. Martin, No. 79-5087 (5th Cir. June 7, 1979),
contained not only such a confession, but also an observation that departures from FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11 were "very great." Id. That is a most informative comment for anyone inter-

ested in the workings of our criminal justice system.
136 No. 77-1900 (10th Cir. Jan. 11, 1979).

-

~
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model of clarity.1 37 Publication of Sanchez would have helped
avoid similar difficulties in the future.
Reversals in routine cases may also reflect a continuing battle
over the correct legal standard to apply. That is especially likely in
areas where a large number of frivolous cases arise. The finder of
fact naturally will seek to dispose of these quickly; the appellate
court, faced with different pressures, may not be so keen. In Kidd
v. Mathews,"'5 for example, the Sixth Circuit, in reversing a denial
of black lung benefits, noted that the "Secretary [of HEW] has
again used conflicting medical tests to prevent the establishment of
the [statutory] presumption."13 The Secretary's evident unhappiness with the governing legal standard should be exposed, so that
others will be aware of the dispute and have the opportunity to
comment on its merits. 4 °
Finally, for all the reasons discussed above, reversals are quite
likely to create law. Many of the decisions discussed in the analysis
of separate opinions and suppressed precedent also were reversals.
That observation should come as no surprise; where the reversal
does not turn on correction of plain error, it is likely that the court
below could not possibly have known the "true" state of the law,
because it had never been declared. Thus the circuit court is forced
to make law. If it does not publish its opinion, it creates a suppressed precedent.
All of the phenomena just discussed weigh strongly in favor of
publication of all reversals. They tell us interesting things about
the workings of our legal system, they provide helpful discussion of
legal concepts, and they sometimes create-or at least clarify-precedent. Furthermore, reversal is an easy criterion to apply.
Unlike most of the criteria used to select opinions for publication,
reversal requires no subjective evaluation. Publishing all reversals,
however, would entail a heavy cost. If all 1018 unpublished nonaffirmances in the survey year14 1 had been published, the number
14 2
of published opinions would have increased by one-fifth.
See
,U No.
139 Id.,
1,0 See
13,

Keating v. Secretary of HEW, 468 F.2d 788, 790 (10th Cir. 1972).
76-2530 (6th Cir. Aug. 24, 1978).
slip op. at 2.
also Lykins v. Macintosh, No. 79-6228 (4th Cir. Apr. 27, 1979) (district court

erred in granting summary judgment in a prisoner's civil rights action). The standard for
summary judgment in civil rights cases has been a subject of dispute in the Fourth Circuit
for some time now. See Limited Publication,supra note 4, at 826 n.84.
1 See Table 13 supra.
141 There were 4699 published dispositions during the study year. See Table 1 supra.
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It may be, however, that some middle ground can be found,
beginning with the observation that not all nonaffirmances deserve
publication. One case, for example, raised questions concerning
Michigan's regulation of abortion clinics under a 1974 statute.14
After the decision below and oral argument in the Sixth Circuit,
Michigan revised the statute. The Sixth Circuit remanded for consideration of the constitutionality of the new law. Because remand
was based upon an intervening event, passage of a new law, the
opinion sheds no light on judicial practice. It is the paradigmatic
opinion without value to anyone other than the litigants.
Similarly, a "pass-through" of a Supreme Court remand has
such little value that its publication would be hard to justify.,44 A
decision not to publish a remand in light of a Supreme Court opinion in another case would be more questionable.
Finally, there is no need to publish a reversal based upon an
intervening change in the law of the circuit. In that situation, the
reversal tells us nothing about the quality of decision making in
either court. It may not even reflect a disagreement over the con45
tent of the substantive law.'

It is impossible to tell from our sample the number of reversals whose publication would not be called for under almost any
criteria.1 46 A rough guess, however, is that about half of the non-

affirmances center on reasons unrelated to the workings of the judiciary and the application of precedent. 47 We believe that the remainder should be published. Although that would entail a
significant public cost, the game should be worth the candle. To
ensure proper handling, we recommend that all reversals be published unless the reversal is based upon a standard or fact not
known to the tribunal below at the time that court or agency made
its decision. We believe that rule will best square cost with benefit.
143

Abortion Coalition v. Michigan Dep't of Pub. Health, No. 77-1223 (6th Cir. Sept. 19,

1978).
144 A different case would be presented by substantive consideration of a Supreme
Court opinion before remand to the trial court. That unquestionably should be published.
In Limited Publication,supra note 4, we recommended publication of all remands of
Supreme Court decisions. Id. at 839. We now believe publication of a "pass-through"
unnecessary.
14 See, e.g., Gardner v. Zahradnick, No. 77-1870 (4th Cir. Sept. 29, 1978) (case held in
abeyance pending decision in Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 970 (1978); remand in Gardner required by rule established in Gordon).
146 The major problem is the cryptic nature of so many of the opinions.
147 One-half is a rough estimate by the authors after reading all nonaffirmances in the

sample.
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621

d. Summary of apparent costs. Far and away the major
problem we have identified in connection with limited publication
is that created by opinions that do not satisfy minimum standards.
Such opinions do not give the appearance that justice has been
done. More important, perhaps, shoddy opinions may reflect the
quality of thought that went into the decision itself. Thoughtless
opinions are a danger to be guarded against resolutely, especially
given the lack of correlation between productivity and below-standard opinions. We believe every opinion can satisfy minimum
standards.
Suppressed precedent is a much less significant problem. If
the courts of appeals were to recall that opinions of public interest
should be published, the problem would be lessened. In addition,
the publication of all decisions with separate opinions, as well as
many reversals, would help both to avoid suppressed precedent
and to ensure the circulation of opinions that are independently of
interest to the public.
3. A Hidden Cost: DisparateImpact and CertiorariCourts.
A third cost, the disparate impact of limited publication, may be
more pernicious, for its full effect stems from the cumulation of
various devices adopted by the courts of appeals over the last decade or so to cope with their increasing caseload. An appreciation of
the problem requires consideration of the interaction between limited publication and three related phenomena: (1) the disproportionately low rate of publication of opinions for some types of litigation, such as prisoners' petitions, Social Security cases, and
appeals in forma pauperis; (2) the decision by the courts of appeals
of a substantial number of cases without oral argument; and (3)
the use by the circuit courts of central staffs of attorneys to aid in
research and decision making.
Table 14 displays the subject matter of the appeals terminated
during the 1978-79 Reporting Year. Most interesting among the
items in the table is the comparatively high nonpublication percentages of prisoner civil rights cases, Social Security cases, and
prisoner petitions in general. Such high nonpublication rates
should come as no surprise, however, for those subject matter areas
are the most likely to produce frivolous litigation because of the
absence of disincentives to appeal. In addition, cases in those categories often involve emotional issues, pursued by litigants who seek
personal vindication without any realistic expectation of legal rem-
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edy. Finally, such claims often turn on factual rather than legal
issues; hence, there is less that an appellate court can do to review
the decision below.
TABLE 14
NATURE OF APPEAL

Subject Matter
of Appeal
United States, Plaintiff
Civil Rights
Tax
Land Condemnation
Other

Number of
Published
Opinions

Number of
Unpublished
Opinions

Opinions not
Published
(%)

11

8

42.1

16
6
110

50
9
102

75.8
60.0
48.1

subtotal
United States, Defendant
Prisoner Petitions
Civil Rights
Social Security
Tort
Other

143

169

54.2

167
94
92
68
339

456
176
305
116
417

73.2
65.2
76.8
63.0
55.2

subtotal
Private Cases
Prisoner Petitions
Civil Rights
Securities
Labor
Tort
Other

760

1470

65.9

290
398
68
91
272
696

1038
708
75
116
357
786

72.7
64.0
52.4
56.0
56.8
53.0

1815

3080

62.9

Criminal

1320

1623

55.1

Total

4038

6342

61.1

subtotal

SouRcE: StatisticalData, supra note 35, Tables 7, 19.

Another problem is the relatively high percentage of unpublished appeals that were filed in forma pauperis. Among unpublished opinions the in forma pauperis rate was 32%, while among
published opinions the rate was only 20%.1" Once again, the dis1"'

These percentages are from StatisticalData, supra note 35, Tables 1P, 3P, 4U, 5U.
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crepancy can be explained by the higher proportion of frivolous in
forma pauperis appeals because of the absence of disincentives to
appeal. Nevertheless, both phenomena-the disparate publication
treatment of certain types of litigation and the relatively high incidence of in forma pauperis cases on the unpublished list-give rise
to concern for two reasons.
First, the disparate impact of nonpublication arguably supports a claim of denial of equal treatment by the courts. The issue
has been raised before the Supreme Court, but was passed over by
the Justices. 149 Before this study, however, there was no hard evidence that certain classes of litigants were most likely to suffer because of limited publication. Nevertheless, even with empirical
confirmation, the constitutional claim is at best colorable, because
the circuit courts' practices would almost certainly pass present
equal protection tests. The statistical frivolity of certain types of
appeals surely provides a rational basis for the disparity, and none
of the types of litigation is based on a currently recognized suspect
classification justifying strict scrutiny.
Whether constitutionally justified or not, litigants in the affected classes still will believe that they have received second class
justice. That is a problem, for the appearance of justice is nearly as
important as the fact.' 50 The federal courts, which view themselves
as the guardians of equal justice under law, should be uniquely
sensitive to claims that their own house may not be in order.
Second, the danger of routine treatment is another threat to
judicial responsibility. It is possible that a judge's mind subconsciously will run along these lines: "This is a prisoner civil rights
action appealed in forma pauperis; past experience tells me there is
nothing to such cases. Therefore, I don't have to think about it,
and if I don't publish an opinion I won't have to sift through a
meaningless record to prove the frivolity of this appeal to an uncaring public." We believe that judges zealously guard against such
irresponsible decision making. But there is a danger of a judge developing a conditioned response to the surface characteristics of
14 An equal protection challenge to the Seventh Circuit's limited publication practice
was made in Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Council of Lawyers at 15-19, Browder V.
Director, 434 U.S. 257 (1978). The Supreme Court's opinion in Browder, however, did not
address that issue.
"0 That may partly explain the relatively high percentage of criminal appeals (44.9%)
that are published. Many of those appeals are, no doubt, frivolous and in forma pauperis.
Yet is is hard to uphold a conviction without some attempt at explanation, and once that
attempt has been made there is an incentive to publish the fruits of the labor.
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certain classes of recurrent and annoying litigation. Requiring a
judge to justify
a decision to the public is one way to minimize that
51
danger.
All of the circuits provide that oral argument need not be
heard for some appeals. The idea is to expedite disposition and
conserve judicial resources in cases where the issues are so plain
that oral argument is most unlikely to add to the quality of decision making. 152 Because such "clean" cases are likely to result in
routine dispositions without precedential impact, we should expect
a substantial coincidence of nonpublication and denial of oral argument. In the survey year, this hypothesis proved true. Only 32%
of unpublished cases were argued orally, as compared to 81% of
published cases.1 58
Although those figures are not surprising, they lend force to
the concern that nonpublication reduces the incentive for judges to
probe beyond the surface of the case. That concern is particularly
acute in cases submitted for decision on the briefs, for oral argument may show a court that the case has depths not apparent from
the paper record. Decision without argument, coupled with the
prospect of nonpublication, removes two safeguards that might
lead a court to notice that the case is not in fact "routine."
Finally, there is the role played by central staff in the formulation of opinions. Over the past decade, many courts, including the
United States Courts of Appeals, have added large numbers of
staff law clerks to assist in preparation for argument and later disposition.'" The Ninth Circuit, for example; employed thirty staff
clerks in 1978.L55 Although the use of staff clerks varies widely
" Judge Coffin addressed this point eloquently in his recent book:
A remarkably effective device for detecting fissures in accuracy and logic is the reduction to writing of the results of one's thought processes .

. .

. Somehow, a decision

mulled over in one's head or talked about in conference looks different when dressed
up in written words and sent out into the sunlight ....
[W]e may be in the very
middle of an opinion, struggling to reflect the reasoning all judges have agreed on, only
to realize that it simply "won't write." The act of writing tells us what was wrong with
the act of thinking.
F. COFFIN,
(1980).

THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH 57

152 APPELLATE JusTcE, supra note 2, at 2-32.
1S STATISTICAL DATA, supra note 35, Tables 1P,

1U, 4P, 4U.
'"See generally D. MEADoR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF
VOLUME (1974); Hellman, supra note 57; Lesinski & Stockmeyer, PrehearingResearch and
Screening in the Michigan Court of Appeals: One Court's Method for IncreasingJudicial
Productivity, 26 VAND. L. REv. 1211 (1973); Thompson, Mitigating the Damage-One
Judge and No Judge Appellate Decisions, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 476 (1975).
'51 Hellman, supra note 57, at 946.
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from court to court, in some the clerks are heavily involved in preparing preargument memoranda and draft opinions. Such procedures present an obvious danger of delegation of judicial responsibility either to the presiding judge of a panel or to the staff itself,
leading to what one state judge styled the "one judge" or "no
judge" decision. 15
That danger increases with the concentration of staff law
clerks in areas of the law where the high volume of cases makes
specialization possible--even desirable, given the possibility of
economies of scale. Those high-volume areas, of course, are most
likely to be the ones where frivolous appeals are the most common-criminal, prisoner, and social security cases, and appeals in
forma pauperis. If, as seems likely, those cases frequently are decided on submission, it can be seen how markedly the process by
which many appeals are "heard" differs from the general perception of an appellate decision as based on a collegial exchange of
views, marked by multiple drafts and developing ideas.15 7
That ideal may not often be attained. In fact, when the cumulative impact of limited publication, central staff, and the associated phenomena is assessed, it can be seen that the courts of appeals often behave much like courts with discretionary
jurisdiction-like certiorari courts, in short. Suppose a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus is denied by a lower court. The case is
reviewed by a staff member, who makes recommendations and
submits draft opinions. It is disposed of without argument by the
court. That process could equally well describe a denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court or the disposition of a "routine" case by
a circuit court. They certainly cannot be distinguished on the
ground that denials of certiorari are unpublished and nonprecedential; so are most such "routine" circuit court decisions. A
plausible distinction is that denials of certiorari typically are not
accompanied by a statement of reasons, but our findings show that
many of the circuit courts' unpublished opinions are similarly bereft of justification. A formal difference exists, of course, in that
discretionary jurisdiction in the Supreme Court has been authorized by Congress,1 58 while the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit
16 0
courts is mandatory.' 5 ' But when washed in the "cynical acid,"
Jo

Thompson, supra note 154.

107The best description of the ideal process is Hart, The Time Chart of the Justices,
73 HRV.L. Rav. 84 (1959).
1" 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976).
"' Id. § 1291.
o Holmes, supra note 6, at 462.
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this formal difference evaporates. For the realist, the processes are
the same. The conclusion is inescapable that, with regard to a large
part of their caseload, the circuit courts have transformed themselves, contrary to congressional mandate, into certiorari courts.
Perhaps such a transformation is the necessary result of an
overwhelming caseload. It may be that little has been lost, and that
the quality of justice has not been diminished appreciably. Certainly some such steps are necessary to allow the continued operation of the system. Yet the cost of a changed appellate process
must be recognized for what it is in order that the final price of
judicial overload can be fully reckoned.
V.

A.

CONCLUSION

A Model Rule

Our survey of the publication habits of the circuit courts confirms that the principal benefit of limited publication is swifter justice; in addition, there may be savings in judicial efforts that in
turn may be translated into gains in productivity. We have also
identified two major costs: suppressed precedent and, more seiously, a marked number of low-quality opinions. Those findings
challenge the critic to fashion a rule that maximizes the benefits of
limited publication while avoiding as many of its costs as possible.
The Model Rule that follows attempts to meet that challenge.
Rule

_. Opinions."' l

1. Minimum Standards:1 62
Every decision will be accompanied by an opinion that sufficiently states the facts of the case, its procedural stance and history, and the relevant legal authority so that the basis for the dis"' We first proposed

a Model Rule for publication in Limited Publication,supra note

4, at 837-40. The version in the text reflects lessons learned in the present study.
The Model Rule does not mention the noncitation corollary to limited publication because this study did not include any findings relative to citation. We have briefly summarized our view of noncitation rules in text and notes at notes 28-33 supra. For a more detailed analysis of noncitation rules, see Non-PrecedentialPrecedent,supra note 4, at 119499. Similarly, this study did not focus on the circulation of unpublished opinions, so the

Model Rule does not address the problem. Our views on circulation are expressed in Limited Publication,supra note 4, at 813-14.

161Inclusion of a section on minimum standards was designed to focus judicial attention on the need to provide a minimally satisfactory explanation of why the court reached a
given result.

1981]

Limited Publication

position can be understood from the opinion and the authority
cited.
If the decision is based on the opinion below, sufficient portions of that opinion should be incorporated into the opinion of
this court so that the basis for this court's disposition can be understood from a reading of this court's opinion.
2.

Publication of Opinions:
a.

Criteria for Publication: An opinion will be published if it:

(1) establishes a new rule of law, or alters or modifies an existing rule of law, or calls attention to an existing rule of law
that appears to have been generally overlooked; 6 s
(2) applies an established rule of law to facts significantly
different from those in previous applications of the rule;""
(3) explains, criticizes, or reviews the history, application, or
1 65
administration of existing decisional or enacted law;
(4) creates or resolves a conflict of authority either within
the circuit or between this circuit and another;1 6
(5) concerns or discusses a factual or legal issue of significant
16' 7
public interest;
(6) is accompanied by a concurring or dissenting opinion;
(7) reverses the decision below, unless:
a) the reversal is caused by an intervening change in
law or fact, or
b) the reversal is a remand (without further comment)
to the district court of a case reversed or remanded by
the Supreme Court;6 8
16s The first clause of this rule was included in the guidelines for opinion publication
suggested by the Federal Judicial Center. See STANDARDS, supra note 17, at 15. It was included in some form in several circuit plans. See DiSm=ICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT PLAN para.
a; 4TH CIR. R. 18(a)(i); 7TH CIR. R. 35(c)(1)(i); 8TH CIR. R. app. I 4(a); 9TH CIR. R. 21(b)(1).
The last clause, the resurrection rule, seems to be the unique property of the Ninth Circuit.
9TH CiR. R. 21(b)(2).
See DiSTR=T OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT PLAN para. e; 8TH CIR. R. app. I 4(c).
161 See DISTICT OF COLUMBIA CiRcurr PLAN para. c; 4TH CiR. R. 18(a)(iii); 7TH CIR. R.
35(c)(1)(iii); 9TH CIR. R. 21(b)(3).
146 See DIT
OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT PLAN para. d; 4TH CiR. R. 18(a)(v); 7TH CIR. R.
35(c)(1)(iv)(C); 8TH CIR. R. app. I 4(b), (f); 10TH CIR. R. 17(d)(1).
161

See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRcurr PLAN para. b;

4TH CIR. R.

18(a)(ii);

7TH Cut.

R.

35(c)(1)(ii); 8TH CIR. R. app. I 4(d); 9TH Cm. R. 21(b)(4).
168 Elsewhere we recommended the publication of all reversals. See Limited Publication, supra note 4, at 839. Here we withdraw that recommendation because it would unnec-
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(8) addresses a lower court or administrative agency decision
that has been published;169 or
(9) is an opinion in a disposition that
a) has been reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court, or
b) is a remand
of a case from the United States Su17 0
preme Court.

b. Publication Decision: There shall be a presumption in
favor of publication. An opinion shall be published unless each
member of the panel deciding the case determines that it fails to
meet the criteria for publication.
3. The court recognizes that the decision of a case without
oral argument and without publication is a substantial abbreviation of the traditional appellate process and will employ both devices in a single case only when the appeal is patently frivolous.
Many of the provisions of the Model Rule were suggested by
existing circuit court rules. We provide textual discussion only of
those provisions that were suggested primarily by the empirical
study.
The most striking finding of the study is the extremely high
cost of nonpublication in terms of opinion quality. Nine of the
eleven circuits produced twenty percent or more below-standard
opinions. In six circuits the figure was above thirty percent.17 1 Sec-

tion 1 of the Model Rule should remedy that situation. The need
for the provision is all the more apparent given that opinion quality is not correlated with productivity.1 72 In other words, by adopting section 1, the courts could remedy the most serious drawback
of nonpublication-poor opinion quality-without reducing productivity. The case for the provision thus is very strong.
essarily increase the courts' published opinion totals by including pass-throughs and other
opinions of limited precedential value.
169 See 4TH Cm. R. 18(a)(vi); SIXTH Cmcurr PLAN 1 1; 7TH CiR. R. 35(c)(1)(v); 8TH Cm.
R. app. T 4(e); 9TH Cm. R. 21(b)(5).
170

A case that has generated a full United States Supreme Court opinion clearly should

be published at the circuit court level-even if the publication order is retroactive. A circuit
court opinion following a remand from the Supreme Court also should be published. However, if the opinion is simply a reference back to the district court, there is no need for

publication.

7' See Table 10 supra.
171See Table 11 supra.
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Section 2 of the Model Rule includes detailed publication criteria. Six of the eleven circuits currently use such detailed criteria.173 Our findings showed no positive correlation between specific-

ity of publication criteria and the percentage of opinions
published. 1" Nevertheless, we favor specific criteria on the theory
that the publication decision will be made in a more intelligent and
consistent manner if the judges have detailed criteria to guide
them. The result should be fewer cases of suppressed precedent.
Additionally, our figures do not disprove the effect of specificity on
publication percentages; they simply fail to prove it.
Three of the criteria warrant individual discussion. Section
2(a)(3) tries to ensure publication of opinions that reflect problems
in the administration of justice or the working of case or statutory
law. Judges are in a unique position to observe such problems. Any
opinions that result from that advantage should be made generally
available.
Section 2(a)(6) of the Model Rule calls for publication of all
opinions that are accompanied by concurring or dissenting opinions. The results of the study provide strong evidence that such
opinions are likely to deserve public dissemination. Of the four
such opinions that we evaluated, only two were correctly left unpublished.'7 5 Furthermore, the cost of such a provision is negligible. In the entire survey year, only thirty-eight such opinions went
unpublished-about 0.5% of the total of unpublished opinions' 1 6
This balance of costs and benefits strongly supports section
2(a)(6).
The situation is not so clear with regard to section
2(a)(7)-publication of reversals. Our findings indicate that many
unpublished reversals should have been published. Some were lawdeclaring opinions and others revealed important information
about the performance of lower courts and administrative agencies.
On the other hand, some reversals, for instance those caused simply by an intervening change in the facts or law, should not have
been published. An addition to the equation is the high cost of
publishing all reversals. In the survey year, such a move would
have increased the total of published opinions by twenty per173

See Table 3 supra.
text and notes at notes 48-50 supra.
See text and notes at notes 116-131 supra.
See text at note 131 supra.

174 See
175

176
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cent.1 7 Accordingly, section 2(a)(7) is a compromise that attempts
to secure the publication of only those reversals that are likely to
be significant.
Section 2(b) of the Model Rule calls for a presumption in
favor of publication. Our results indicate that such a presumption
is likely to affect actual publication behavior, because circuits with
a presumption against publication actually did publish less than
circuits without such a presumption. 17 8 Increased publication is

likely to diminish the problems of suppressed precedent and poor
opinion quality. Although there may be some loss in the area of
swifter justice, our results do not suggest that productivity is likely
to suffer. 179 Section 2(b) also requires a unanimous decision of the
panel in order not to publish.
The language of Section 3 is entirely precatory. It simply calls
for judges to recognize the dangers inherent in combining several
judicial "shortcuts" in a single case. There is some temptation to
call for publication in all cases in which there is no oral argument
or vice-versa, but the cost of such a provision is high. In the survey
year, it would have more than doubled the total of published opinions. 18 Our hope is that the precatory language of Section 3 will
call the judges' attention to the possibility that they may be transforming their courts, without statutory authority, into certiorari
courts.
B. Summing Up
The discussion of limited publication has produced numerous
claims concerning the harms and benefits of the practice. This
study permits an empirical evaluation of many of these claims. It is
clear that limited publication produces at least one significant benefit-swifter appellate justice. The claimed benefit of savings of judicial time and effort is less clear. It is difficult to read many unpublished opinions without concluding that relatively little time
and effort was spent in their production. Yet we found no positive
correlation between a circuit's tendency not to publish and its pro177 The number of published opinions for the survey year in all circuits was 4699. See

Table 1 supra. There were 1018 unpublished nonaflirmances. See Table 13 supra.
See text and notes at notes 51-53 supra.
See text and note at note 65 supra.
SO If the 78% of all unpublished opinions decided without oral argument, see text and

176
179

note at note 153 supra, had been published, the number of published opinions would have
shot up from 4699 to 10,721. See Table 1 supra.
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ductivity. Other variables may obscure the relationship between
nonpublication and productivity. Alternatively, the judges may be
using the time saved to perform important but not case-related
functions. Although we suspect that the time-savings hypothesis is
true, we are unable to verify it empirically.
Our examination of the circuits' work has provided little to
justify major concern about the problem of suppressed precedent.
We did, however, find a number of cases where valuable discussions of difficulties with the law or its administration were submerged. The circuit courts could substantially remedy the problem
by adhering to several of the provisions of our Model Rule.
The more significant drawback to the system is its pernicious
effect on judicial responsibility. In many circuits, large percentages
of the unpublished opinions failed to satisfy even minimum standards. Further, when nonpublication is combined with denial of
oral argument, the result may curtail the appellate process in a
way inconsistent with the mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the
courts of appeals. Once again the Model Rule provides a way to
reduce those costs substantially.
Perhaps the greatest danger of any procedural reform is that it
will be adopted without sufficient reflection or continued without
sufficient study. Although the publication plans received ample
thought before their adoption and during their first several years
of operation, study of the effects of the plans has almost entirely
ceased. From 1973 until 1977, the plans were the subject of annual
reports by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to
the Judicial Conference of the United States. The reports are no
longer being made; since 1977 the study of the plans has come
largely from outside of the judicial system. Clearly the courts
themselves have no facilities to conduct such inquiries. The proper
agency is the Administrative Office. Data on the workings of the
publication plans (and other recent appellate court reforms)
should be included as a regular part of the Annual Report. Perhaps
after several years of such reporting, more ambitious statistical
studies will be possible and will provide more conclusive answers
to the questions arising out of the limited publication debate.

